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It all started with a bang! Maritime security drastically evolved due to the tragic events of 11 
September 2001(9/11), when a series of coordinated terrorist attacks were made on the 
United States of America. This unprecedented and catastrophic incident of terrorism shocked 
the world but more importantly drew the attention of the international maritime security 
authorities to the vulnerabilities of the seaports to acts of terrorism and other criminal threats. 
 
The most significant international agreement relating to maritime safety and security is the 
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and this agreement was 
amended in 2002 in London, to include a new provision, that is the International Ship and 
Port Facility (ISPS) Code. The ISPS Code is in essence a framework of maritime security 
measures designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities.  
 
This dissertation is a study of the ISPS Code, an analysis of the regulatory provisions of the 
ISPS Code, its implementation and impact. The ISPS Code was implemented on 01 July 
2004 and currently applies to 162 States that are contracting governments to SOLAS. This 
study has four chapters, chapter one sets out the background to the development of maritime 
security and it includes a regional perspective on maritime security as well as a status update 
on the main commercial ports in South Africa. Thereafter, chapter two is dedicated to 
providing the reader with an understanding of the provisions of the ISPS Code, describing its 
purpose, objectives and key elements. 
 
Chapter three focuses on maritime security and terrorism. It provides the reader with 
summaries of maritime incidents that occurred prior to the implementation of the ISPS Code 
as well as incidents that took place after its implementation in order to assess its success in 
achieving its objectives of enhancing international maritime security.  Finally chapter four 
provides a detailed analysis of the implementation and impact of the ISPS Code in South 
Africa as well as it implementation in other signatory countries of SOLAS such as Singapore, 
Iran and the United Kingdom.  This chapter then concludes with recommendations made to 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME 
SECURITY IN TERMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY 
SECURITY (ISPS) CODE  
 
1.1  Introduction  
This chapter provides the background knowledge on the development of the ISPS Code from 
an international, a regional and thereafter a South African perspective. There is a brief layout 
of South African legislation relevant to maritime security as well as the current status of its 
main commercial ports.  
 
1.2  International Perspective on Maritime Security 
The first modern instance of vessel hijacking that attracted international attention was the 
seizure of the Portuguese passenger liner Santa Maria in January 1961.1 Then in 1985, the 
hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro2
Maritime security drastically evolved due to the catastrophic events of 11 September 
2001(9/11), when a sequence of synchronised terrorist attacks were made in the United States 
of America, specifically on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by the extremist 
Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda. This unprecedented and catastrophic incident of terrorism 
shocked the world, but importantly drew the attention of the international maritime security 
authorities to the vulnerabilities of seaports to acts of terrorism and other criminal threats. 
 resulted in the development of the Convention on 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA 
Convention).  
 
                                                          
1 L Joubert ‘The extent of maritime terrorism and piracy: a comparative analysis’ (2013) Journal of Military 
Studies Vol 41, No 1 pp111-137 at 118. Colonel Galvao and a group of 24 Portuguese insurgents hijacked the 
Santa Maria. The Colonel and his insurgents planned on overthrowing the government of Portugal (the Salazar 
regime) with the intention to sail the vessel to Angola. An officer was killed and a crew member was injured. 
There was difficulty in handling this case as it could not be defined as piracy since it was of a political nature. 
2  On 7 October 1985, the Italian MS Achille Lauro liner was hijacked while sailing from Alexandria to Ashdod, 
Israel by four men from the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). This incident was recorded in history as one of the 
first terrorist acts. JPB Coelho African Approaches to Maritime Security: Southern Africa (2013) and D C 
Turack ‘Maritime Terrorism and International Law’ (1992) 41 (2) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 490 FES Peace and Security Series 12: 5. The SUA Convention was intended to ensure that 
responsible authorities extradites or prosecutes  persons responsible for committing terrorist acts at sea.  
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The United Nations General Assembly convened an emergency session on 12 September 
2001 aimed at condemning the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America and adopting 
resolutions to enhance global maritime security.3  A delegation from South Africa was 
present during this session.4 Thereafter, there were various platforms in which engagements 
occurred in relation to the discussions of methods to enhance maritime security. It was 
decided that the best method for the enhancement of worldwide maritime security was to 
develop it at an international level.5
 
  
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) is one of the most 
significant international maritime agreements relating to security and safety. This Convention 
was first adapted in 1914 in reaction to the Titanic disaster then a second adaptation in 1929, 
third adaptation in 1948, fourth adaptation in 1960 and finally the fifth and current adaptation 
in 1974. SOLAS has been amended on numerous occasions in order to meet the maritime 
industry needs and is currently named SOLAS 1974, as amended.6 After the tragic incident of 
the 9/11 attacks, this significant Convention was again amended to include the International 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 
which took the lead in formulating numerous security related recommendations and 
Conventions by engaging states in discussions to develop international conventions designed 
to enhance international maritime security.7
 
  
These new provisions in the SOLAS, 1974 as amended and the inclusion of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) were adopted during a Diplomatic Conference 
on Maritime Security in December 2002 in London.8 This new security regime for the 
protection of both merchant ships and seaports was implemented on 01 July 20049
                                                          
3D L Bryant ‘Historical and Legal Aspects of Maritime Security’ 17 U.S.F Maritime Law Journal (1) 2004-
2005 at 10. 
  and was 
4General Assembly Press Release GA/9903, United Nations, Opening its Fifty-Sixth Session, ‘General 
Assembly Condemns Heinous Acts of Terrorism Perpetuated in Host City and Washington’ 2001 available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ga9903.doc.htm (accessed on 19 May 2015). 
5T J Schoenbaum and J C Langston ‘An All Hands Evolution: Port Security in the Wake of September 11th’ 
2002-2003 77 Tulane Law Review at 1345. 
6 History and Background of the SOLAS Convention 1974 is available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-
of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx (accessed on 23 January 2015). 
7R Balkin 'The International Maritime Organisation and Maritime Security' 2006 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 
30 at 3. 
8 ‘Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974’ 
(2002) available at www.un.org. 
9The IMO website have numerous documents on the topic of Maritime Security ‘Maritime Security and Piracy’ 
available at http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/Pages/MaritimeSecurity.aspx (accessed on 23 April 2015). 
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effective in 147 States. Currently these new security measures apply to 162 Member States of 
SOLAS that are contracted to comply with the requirements set out in the ISPS Code.10 At 
the Intersessional Working Group Conference on Maritime Security during 9-13 September 
2002, the ISPS Code was described as an establishment of a worldwide framework that 
encompasses the co-operation between various key role-players such as contracting 
governments, government agencies, local administrations, shipping and port industries for the 
purposes of firstly, detecting security threats and secondly, ensuring that preventative 
measures are taken against security incidents that impact on ship and port facilities.11
 
  
The ISPS Code is in essence a framework of maritime security measures designed to improve 
port facilities and ships security.12
 Part A: Comprises of certain obligatory provisions, reference of which is also made in 
chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, 1974 as amended. This part creates the new global structure 
of measures to improve maritime security. This is achieved by ships and port facilities 
working jointly for the purpose of detecting and thereafter deterring security threats in 
the maritime transport sector.
 This Code contains detailed and comprehensive security-
related requirements for governments, shipping companies and port authorities. It is further 




 Part B: This section fleshes out the contents of Part A and is non-mandatory but 
recommendatory.14 However, some countries are considering making Part B 
mandatory whilst other countries like the USA have already made Part B 
mandatory.15 Korea16, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union17
                                                          
10 Ibid.  
 have made some provisions of Part B mandatory in their national legislations.  
11 Press Release IMO, ‘Maritime Security Measures Take Shape at IMO’ (2002) available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2435 (accessed on 20 May 2015). 
12 Maritime Port Authority of Singapore ‘Port Security: ISPS Code’ available at www.mpa.gov.sg (accessed on 
06 February 2015). 
13 Part A of the ISPS Code s1, 1.1 – Guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended and Part A of this Code. 
14Transnet National Port Authority ‘A World Class Port Security Service’ (2007) available: 
http://www.transnetnationalportsauthority.net/DoingBusinesswithUs/Pages/Security.aspx (accessed on 17 
February 2015). 
15Most provisions of Part B of the ISPS Code are enforced in the United States Maritime Transport Security Act 
of 2002 Q van der Merwe, ‘ISPS Code- Maritime Security’ (2003) available: 
http://ports.co.za/legalnews/article_2003_08_15_1144.html (accessed on 18 February 2015).  
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1.3 Regional Perspective on Maritime Security  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is utilised as a driving force for 
economic integration in Southern Africa since its existence in the year 1980. The SADC 
Treaty, specifically Article 5 provides objectives to realise integrated economic security 
within the region, of most relevance is the objective to promote and defend peace and 
security.18
In Angola, Luanda, during 2011, the Heads of State signed the SADC Maritime Security 
Strategy. South Africa together with Tanzania and Mozambique have been in collaboration 
on a number of maritime security related projects including maritime security and anti-piracy 
operations in the Indian Ocean, which is of vital importance as it is the earth’s third-largest 
ocean and transports half of the world’s trade in oil.
 
19
The SADC Maritime Security Strategy is progressing well as a number of countries at the 
20th Standing Maritime Committee meeting in Lusaka, Zambia during 4-5 April 2014 have 
signed cooperation agreements that include: 
 
 The establishment of Maritime Domain Awareness Centres (MDACs) in 
Mozambique and Tanzania which are to be connected with those in Cape Town and 
Durban. 
 Co-operational framework signed between Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and Malawi.  
 A memorandum of understanding between South Africa, Angola and Namibia on 
maritime cooperation aimed at addressing maritime security on the West Coast.20
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 J Jibkwon ‘Progress and Challenges: Ten years after the ISPS Code’ (2013) World Maritime University, 
Sweden 20 available at http://dlib.wmu.se/jspui/bitstream/123456789/836/1/77473.pdf (accessed on 27 May 
2015). 
17 C Pohlit ‘New Developments in Maritime Security and the Impact on International Shipping’ Dissertation 
submitted at University of Cape Town 26, available at http://uctscholar.uct.ac.za/PDF/1373_Pohlit.pdf  
(accessed on 28 April 2015). Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 on Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security. 
18 KJ Watson ‘Promoting the Creation of an integrated Maritime Security Capability on the Southern African 
Coast’ (2011) Conference. 
19L Louw-Vaudran ‘What does ensuring SADC's maritime security mean for South Africa?’ (2014) available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/what-does-ensuring-sadcs-maritime-security-mean-for-south-africa 




1.4 South African Maritime Legislative Framework  
In South Africa, the following legislation plays a significant role in ensuring maritime 
security: 
 The Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, which is the supreme law of South 
Africa and provides the legal foundation for the existence of the Republic and which 
all laws in the Republic have to be in line with.  
 
 The National Ports Act 12 of 2005, which provides for the establishment of the 
National Ports Authority and the Ports Regulator as well as to provide for the 
administration of certain ports by the National Ports Authority. In addition, the 
essential objective of this Act is to promote the development of an effective and 
productive port industry in South Africa that is capable of contributing to the 
economic growth and development of our country.21
 
 
 The Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004 derived from the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1951. The objectives of the Regulations include the 
implementation of the ISPS Code in order for South Africa to comply with its 
international obligations under Chapter XI-2 of the Safety Convention. 
 
1.5  South African Maritime Interest 
Due to South Africa’s internal race policies, the United Nations actively promoted the 
exclusion of South Africa from international conventions and encouraged boycotts against 
the country.   
After a long struggle for freedom, South Africa finally unlocked itself internationally after it 
held its first democratic elections in April 1994, only then was South Africa exposed to 
global trends.22
                                                          
21 National Ports Act 12 of 2005, Section 2 Objectives at 10. 
 Its maritime zones, spreading out to the edge of the continental shelf, 
including the exclusive economic zone, encompass an area of over 1 million square 




kilometres.23 This massive ocean domain is potentially rich in natural resources, and 
environmentally of significant global importance.24
International trade is essential for many African economies and over 90% of Africa’s exports 
and imports take place at sea.
 
25
South Africa currently identifies itself as an essential component of the African continent and 
as a result comprehends its national interest as being fundamentally connected to Africa’s 
maritime security. In order to maintain international standards, South Africa, being a 
signatory to the IMO, has ratified the ISPS Code. The following are some reasons for 
ratifying the ISPS Code: 
  The ports therefore play an extremely important role in the 
economics of the country. The international community looks to South Africa to be a leader 
in cultivating change and progress, not just in Southern Africa, but in the entire continent as 
well.   
o Vessels visiting ports that are non-compliant with the ISPS Code could be viewed as a 
security risk and could be turned away at ports that are compliant to the Code.26
o A ship may be declared unsafe for visiting a port that is non-compliant with the ISPS 




o Furthermore, failure of a port to comply with the ISPS Code may constitute prima 




o Non-compliance with the ISPS Code may result in ship operators avoiding that port in 




                                                          
23 M Siko 'South Africa's Maritime Interests and Responsibilities' (1996) at 5 African Security Review.  
24C Forrest ‘The Balancing of Maritime Interests in the Southern African Oceans in Light of the New 
International Maritime Security Regime’ (2008) 41 (1) The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa at 6. 
25 ‘Africa’s ports vital for world trade’ (2015) available at www.itonline.co.za (accessed on 13 April 2015). 
26Q van der Merwe ‘ISPS Code- Maritime Security’ (2003) available: 
http://ports.co.za/legalnews/article_2003_08_15_1144.html (accessed on 18 February 2015). 
27 N Karigithu ‘Port Security – The ISPS Code’ (2008) available at 




The ISPS Code has been implemented in South Africa through the Merchant Shipping 
(Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004, which is provided for in the Merchant Shipping Act 
57 of 1951.29 The National Department of Transport is the selected custodian for 
implementing the ISPS Code as per the National Ports Act 12 of 2005.30
The Department of Transport as custodian, developed methods to encourage maritime 
transport and as such, allocated the operational aspects of maritime transport responsibilities 
to various government agencies such as the South African Maritime Safety Authority 
(SAMSA), Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), Transnet Port Terminal (TPT) and the 
South African Ports Regulator.
  
31
1.6  Status of Commercial Ports in SA  
  
Transnet National Ports Authority is in terms of section 3(1) of the National Ports Act, 2005 
(Act No. 12 of 2005), a port authority which owns, manages, controls and administers all 
ports within the Republic to ensure their efficient and economic functioning. South Africa has 
eight commercial ports that are all managed by TNPA. Maritime security plans are in place at 
these ports and implemented by the relevant port facilities and service providers.32  The 
TNPA succeeded in certifying South Africa’s eight major ports as compliant with the ISPS 
Code at a cost of over R200 million.33
South Africa’s eight main commercial ports are:  
   
 Richards Bay  
 Durban 
 East London 
 Port Elizabeth  
 Mossel Bay  
 Cape Town  
 Saldanha Bay 
 Ngqura  
                                                          
29 Forrest op cit n 24 at 11. 
30Transnet National Port Authority op cit n 14. 
31Draft South African Maritime Transport Policy (2008). 
32Transnet National Ports Authority Presentation op cit n 14 at slide 6.  
33Forrest op cit n 24.  
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South Africa acknowledges that neglecting maritime security can result in a loss of economic 
prospects as well as grave economic threats,34
 TNPA has issued an ISPS Vessel Clearance Procedure, Policy Number: SMP 3/2010 
with the objective of ensuring that all the ports falling within the jurisdiction of the 
TNPA adhere to the same procedures when dealing with maritime security regulated 
vessels intending to call in any of these ports. (See Annexure 1). 
 so it is making a concerted effort in ensuring 
that it complies with international standards, as well as ensuring that all role-players have a 
common understanding on the implementation of such regulations. This is evident in a 
number of documents/notices that are in place to ensure compliance as well as an 
understanding of the ISPS Code and other relevant International Maritime Security Codes 
and Regulations: 
 
 SAMSA Marine Notice 12 of 2008, the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) 
Regulations, 2004 provides guidance to the maritime industry on the application of 
the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004 and the ISPS Code 
(See Annexure 2). Specific guidance is provided on various maritime security related 
matters including: 
o Certification of South African Ships 
o Security Level in South African Territorial Waters 
o Port Security 
 
 SAMSA Marine Notice No. 20 of 2014; Unlawful Interference with Maritime 
Transport – Stowaways, SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Maritime Security (See Annexure 3). 
This notice informs all ship owners, masters and agents on maritime security 
regulations related to the following: 
o SOLAS Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security. 
o ISPS Code, Part B, item 8: Ship Security Assessment 
o ISPS Code, Part B, item 9: Ship Security Plan  
  
 SAMSA Marine Notice 5 of 2015, Procedures to be followed for Bulk Cargo 
Shipment which are not listed in the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code. 
                                                          




This notice clears the confusion within the shipping industry on the statutory 
procedures of compliance for the shipment of solid bulk cargoes which are not listed 
in the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (Code published by the IMO) 
(See Annexure 4). 
1.7  Conclusion  
The development of the ISPS Code has resulted in an international consensus on the 
methodology of securing the maritime environment; this methodology is that of compliance 
with the regulation of the ISPS Code. In addition, market forces and economic factors will 
also play a role in ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code.35
 
  With the increasing number of 
contracting states to the SOLAS, it is inevitable that these new security measures, as part of 
the ISPS Code will soon be embodied in most of the maritime communities’ national 
legislations, as all those involved in the maritime industry strive to protect trade at sea and be 
recognised as complying with international conventions.  
South Africa is at an advanced stage of implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code 
as it has already created its domestic legislation. The Merchant Shipping Regulations 2004 
embodies the critical provisions of the ISPS Code and more importantly, all of South Africa’s 
commercial ports are compliant to the provisions of the ISPS Code. Furthermore, South 
Africa’s participation in international forums, reaffirms its intention of ensuring that its levels 
of maritime security compliance standards are of an international level and this is maintained. 
South Africa actively participates in various forums focusing on the enhancement of maritime 
security, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Abuja Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control, Southern African Transport Co-ordinating Committee 
(SATCC), International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of 






                                                          
35 International Maritime Organization IMO: ‘ISPS Code and Maritime Security’ available at 
www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897 (accessed on 26 April 2015). 
36Draft South African Maritime Transport Policy (2008) Section 1 at 7. 
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ISPS CODE 
2.1 Introduction 
Maritime security is an international responsibility and as such, there exist an international 
legal framework wherein one of the most important regulations is the SOLAS Chapter XI-2 
amendments that contain the ISPS Code.  
 
The ISPS Code is divided into two parts, Part A is mandatory whilst Part B is 
recommendatory. This chapter will provide an understanding of each regulation in terms of 
the ISPS Code, thereafter due to the importance of Part A being mandatory, further 
commentaries will be provided for a deeper understanding and meaning of the applicable 
provisions and in certain instances, the practical ways in which states employ these measures.  
 
It is important to note that the ISPS Code requires cooperation between Governments, 
government agencies, local administrations, shipping and port industries.37 A number of the 
provisions of the ISPS Code are in fact previous recommendations made by IMO following 
the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1986. Some of these provisions include an obligation on 
member states to ensure that there are security plans and appointed security officers for their 
ship and port facilities. The actual process in the ISPS Code of ensuring security of the port 
facilities and ship is essentially a risk management activity, which is conducted by assessing 
the risks in order to determine the appropriate security measures required.38
 
 
2.2 Purpose of the ISPS Code  
Due to the acts of terrorism directed at the United States of America, the international body 
of maritime security, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), developed security 
measures to protect vessels in the world fleet and global port facilities from such criminal 
acts. The security measures have been incorporated in the amendments to the Safety of Life 
at Sea Convention, 1974 (SOLAS Convention). A new international framework of measures 
to enhance maritime security was created by the adoption of the ISPS Code. It is an 
                                                          
37 H Hesse and N L Charalambous ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’ 2004 3 
(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 123–138 at 123. 
38 International Maritime Organization ‘Enhancing Maritime Security’ available at 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=582 (accessed on 25 April 2015). 
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instrument through which ships and port facilities can co-operate with each other to detect 
and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.39
2.3  Objectives of the ISPS Code  
 
The objectives of the Code as stated in Part A: 
1. “To establish an international framework involving co-operation between Contracting 
Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port 
industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents 
affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade; 
2. To establish the respective roles and responsibilities of the Contracting Governments, 
Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries, at the 
national and international level for ensuring maritime security; 
3. To ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-related information; 
4. To provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans and 
procedures to react to changing security levels; and 
5. To ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are in 
place.”40
Maritime security is a collective international responsibility and to ensure the success of a 
secure maritime environment, it is critical that security measures are consistent and 
standardised. The ISPS Code seeks to establish an international framework that can be 
utilised by the maritime community in relation to maritime security. It essentially provides 
for the detection and deterrence of security threats as well as a methodology of assessing 
security whilst establishing the roles and responsibilities of various parties. The ISPS Code 
enables the collection and the exchange of security information. It further ensures that 






                                                          
39 ISPS Code, Part B. 
40 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at 1.2 Objectives at 4. 
41 Lloyd’s Register Marine ‘ISPS Code’ available at http://www. lr.org/en/marine/compliance/standards-
schemes-codes-and-directives/isps-code.aspx (accessed on 25 May 2015). 
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2.4  Security Levels 
The setting of the security level is the responsibility of the contracting government. The Code 
contains three security levels namely: 
 Security Level 1: Normal: This is the typical operational level of ships and port 
facilities.42
o Access to the port facility should be controlled. 
 This level provides for minimum protective security measures to be sustained 
at all times. For a security level 1, the following activities should be carried out: 
o All port facility duties should be performed. 
o The supervision of the handling of ship stores and cargoes. 
o The restricted areas should be monitored in order to certify that only those that 
are authorised accordingly have access.   
o Security related communications should be readily available. 
o The port facility should be monitored.43
 
  
In South Africa’s territorial water and eight main commercial ports, Security Level 1 
applies and any change of security level in the South African territorial water will be 
notified by Marine Notice, Navigational Warning and Notices to Mariners whilst any 




 Security Level 2: Heightened: This level applies for the duration of the period of the 
heightened risk of a security incident.45
 
 This level provides for supplementary protective 
security measures to be sustained for a period of time.  
 Security Level 3: Exceptional: This level is applicable for the duration of a probable or 
imminent risk of a security incident.46
                                                          
42 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at 5. 
 This level provides for additional particular 
protective security measures to be maintained for a period of time. Setting security level 
3, according to the Code, should firstly only be applied when there is credible information 
43 Specific guidelines are available at www.imo.org.za. 
44 South African Maritime Safety Authority, Marine Notice No.12 of 2008, the Merchant Shipping (Maritime 
Security) Regulations, 2004, Regulation 3. 




that a security incident is probable or imminent and secondly only be set for the time 
period of the identified security threat/actual security incident.  
The three levels defined above is as stated in the ISPS Code; however, a basic understanding 
of the levels would be Level 1 equals a low threat situation, whilst Level 2 amounts to a 
medium threat situation and Level 3 is a high threat situation. Since each ship and each port 
facility will have a different risk, it is the responsibility of the Contracting Government to 
determine and set up the security level. The security level set in fact creates a link between 
the ship and the port facility as it triggers the application of certain security measures for the 
ship and the port facility as per the ISPS Code regulations.    
2.5 Minimum Functional Security Requirements  
The ISPS Code comprises of numerous minimum functional security requirements for both 
ships and port facilities which can be viewed as part of Basic Risk Management activity.47 
Basic Risk Management principles can be divided in two elements, firstly to identify risks 
and secondly to quantify risks.48 Therefore in the risk management process, an assessment of 
the risk needs to be conducted in order to determine suitable and correct security measures.49 
Training and drills are of vital importance in ensuring the application of these security 
requirements.50
Security Requirements in the ISPS Code: 
 
 Ships require Ship Security Officers (SSO), Company Security Officers (CSO), Ship 
Security Plans (SSP) and certain onboard equipment.  
 Port Facilities require Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO), Port Facility Security Plans 
(PFSP) and certain security equipment. 
 Ships and Port Facilities require monitoring and controlling access, ensuring security 
communications and monitoring the activities of people and cargo. 
                                                          
47 IMO ‘IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures’ 2002 available at 
www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689 (accessed on 07 May 2015). IMO stated that 
maritime security is a risk management system and that the ISPS Code is a support to SOLAS and each 
contracting government as a methodology to improve the response and the system performance concerning 
maritime security. 
48P Hellberg ‘Effects of the ISPS Code on Ship and Port Security – A Swedish Perspective’ 2009 available at 
http://dlib.wmu.se/jspui/bitstream/123456789/737/1/20052.pdf (accessed on 25 May 2015) at 19. 
49H Hesse and N L Charalambous op cit n 37 at 125. 
50C Trelawny ‘Maritime Security: Implementation of the ISPS Code’ 2005 IMO 3rd Intermodal Africa 2005 
Tanzania Exhibition and Conference Dar es Salaam at 5. 
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2.6  Key Elements of the ISPS Code 
The ISPS Code is 89 pages in length and is divided into two parts: 
2.6.1 Part A of the ISPS Code  
Part A comprises of obligatory requirements regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the 
SOLAS, 1974 as amended, that impose obligations on governments, shipping companies and 
port authorities. This part creates a new global structure of measures to improve maritime 
security through which port facilities and ships can work together to detect and deter acts 
which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.51
Part B of the ISPS Code is of vital importance and it is evident as throughout the provisions 
contained in Part A of the Code, reference is made to the specific guidance that is provided 
by Part B of the ISPS Code.   
 
Part A is divided into 19 Regulations and includes 2 Appendixes, it covers the following: 
Regulation 1: General 
This section confirms that Part A is mandatory; it further provides the objectives of the code 
as well as the functional requirements needed in order to achieve its objectives.52
 
  
Regulation 2: Definitions 
This is a standard definitions section providing an understanding on the various requirements 
of port and ship security plans and officers as well as the different security levels.53
 
 
Regulation 3: Application 
Details are provided of the ships that would be subject to this Code as well as those ships that 
have been excluded. Contracting Governments are also provided with guidelines on 
application of the Code to port facilities. The ISPS Code is applicable to ships on 
international voyages which includes cargo ships of 500 GT and upwards, mobile offshore 
drilling units, passenger ships and the port facilities serving such ships. The ISPS Code is not 
                                                          
51 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at 2. 
52 Ibid at Regulation 1 at 4. 
53 Ibid at Regulation 2 at 5. 
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applicable to warships, naval auxiliaries, other ships owned or operated by a Contracting 
Government and used only on Government non-commercial service.54
The application of the ISPS Code to certain vessels only, is a cause for concern, as it can be 
viewed as creating a loophole in the system. In the event of terrorists becoming aware of the 
fact that certain types of vessels are exempted from these enhanced security measures, they 
may use these vessels for their advantage. Some countries have taken cognisance of this 
loophole in the framework and acknowledged the possibility of the exempted vessels being 
utilised by terrorist and other criminal networks. So they have created their own set of 
enhanced maritime security measures, in Regulations specifically focusing on the vessels that 
fall outside the scope of the ISPS Code.   
  
The IMO recognises the concern of vessels that fall outside the scope of the ISPS Code and 
have created guidelines on the security aspects to assist signatories to SOLAS in this regard. 
Its guideline comes in the form of a circular MSC.1/Circ.128355
 
, with heading Non-
mandatory guidelines on security aspects of the operation of vessels which do not fall within 
the scope of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. Other signatories to SOLAS like the 
United Kingdom are utilising this guideline by making it readily available for its users.  
Regulation 4: Responsibilities of Contracting Governments (RSO) 
Port facility security levels may vary from port to port therefore Contracting Governments 
are tasked with the responsibility of setting security levels and providing guidance for 
safeguarding against security incidents. Contracting Governments may further delegate 
certain responsibilities related to security to a Recognised Security Organisation (RSO). The 
responsibilities of the Contracting Governments include the communication of information, 
testing ship security plans, setting security levels, notification of security levels, and 
declaration of security.  To determine the applicability of a Declaration of Security, the risk 
of the ship posing to people, property and the environment is assessed.56
There are factors that need to be taken in consideration when setting security levels, such as 
the potential consequences of the security incidents, whether the threat information is 
  
                                                          
54 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 3 at 6-7. 
55 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1283 http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=24823&filename=1283.pdf 
(accessed on 06 October 2015).  
56 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 4 at 7. 
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credible, specific/imminent, corroborated. 57
In Singapore, the RSO is appointed by the Maritime Port Authority (MPA) to perform the 
following responsibilities:  
 It is important to note that the duties of the 
Contracting Governments are crucial to the successful implementation of the ISPS Code. 
 Issue International Ship Security Certificates to Singapore flagged ships on its behalf.  
 Approve Ship Security Plan (SSP).  
 Assist the Singapore MPA to complete security assessments, and formulate or endorse 
Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) port facilities of Singapore. 58
 
 
Regulation 5: Declaration of Security (DoS) 
Contracting Governments are responsible for determining when a Declaration of Security is 
needed and this section provides for a method for Contracting Governments to do so, namely: 
evaluating the risk the ship/port interface or ship-to-ship activity poses to persons, property or 
the environment. This section also lists the circumstances under which the Declaration of 
Security can be requested. For instance the ship can request the DoS if there has been a 
security threat or security incident. The Declaration of Security shall further be completed by 
the Master or Ship Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officer. The duration for 
which the Declaration shall be retained by ships shall be determined by the Administration. 59
 
 
Regulation 6: Obligations of the Company 
It is the obligation of the Company to ensure that certain details are provided for the 
compilation of the Ships Security Plan such as a clear statement highlighting the master’s 
overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding the ship’s safety and 
security. Furthermore, the Company Security Officer, the Master and the Ship Security 
Officer shall be given the required support to fulfil their responsibilities.60
                                                          
57Additional guidance is provided in MSC/Circ. 1074 on Interim Guidelines for the authorization of RSOs 
available at www.imo.org. 
 Signatories to 
SOLAS, are developing methods of assisting the Company and Ship Security Officers in 
58 Maritime Port Authority of Singapore op cit n 12. 
59ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 5 at 8. 
60Ibid at Regulation 6 at 8-9. 
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compiling the Ship Security Plan, one of the methods utilised by the United Kingdom is 
making available model Ship Plans for various types of vessels.61
 
  
Regulation 7: Ship Security  
Contracting Governments set security levels that a ship is required to act upon. Activities are 
listed for each security level62 that are to be carried out in order to detect and take 
precautionary measures against security incidents. Security Level 1 provides for a list of 
seven activities that need to be carried out in order to identify and take preventative measures 
against security incidents.  Whilst at Security Level 2 additional protective measures shall be 
implemented for each activity of Security Level 1. Security Level 3 requires further specific 
protective measures for each activity mentioned for Security Level 1.  It is further noted that 
with each of the three security levels, guidance is provided in Part B of the Code which is 
recommended to be considered.63
In Malaysia, at Port Klang when a security level is increased, additional external support is 




Regulation 8: Ship Security Assessment (SSA) 
  
The Ship Security Assessment serves the purpose to develop and update the Ship Security 
Plan. The Company Security Officer is to ensure that the Ship Security Assessment is 
conducted by persons with suitable skills to assess the security of a ship. Note that the 
Recognised Security Organisation may also carry out the Ship Security Assessment. The Ship 
Security Assessment shall further be accordingly documented, reviewed and reserved by the 
Company. The SSA shall include an on-scene security survey as well as identification of a 
number of elements detailed in this section.65
 
 
                                                          
61 See templates for better understanding, published by the UK Department of Transport available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/model-ship-security-plan-templates (accessed on 06 October 
2015). 
62 For an example for a security level 1: there should be supervision of the handling of cargo and ships stores, 
deck areas and areas surrounding the ship should be monitored, access to the ship should be controlled and 
restricted areas should be monitored in order to ensure that only authorised persons have access.  
63ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 7 at 9-10. 
64 P Gunasekaran ‘Port Security in a developing country pre and post 9/11 terrorist attacks: A Case Study on 
Port Klang in Malaysia’ (2012), a Thesis submitted to the University of Greenwich, London at 170. 
65ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 8 at 10-11. 
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The Ship Security Assessment further addressed the following fundamentals within or on 
board the ship: physical security, procedural policies, structural integrity, personnel 
protection systems, radio, telecommunication, computer systems and other areas. 
 
Regulation 9: Ship Security Plan (SSP) 
The Ship Security Plan is intended to safeguard various persons on board, as well as cargo 
and the vessel from the risks of security incidents. The purpose of a Ship Security Plan is to 
assist in preventing unlawful acts against the vessel, crew and passengers as well as to 
minimise damage to the port facilities and maritime environment.66
 
  
On board a vessel, there should be a Ship Security Plan that is approved by the 
Administration or a Recognised Security Organisation. The Ship Security Plan shall be 
protected from unauthorised access or disclosure and not subject to inspection under control 
and compliance measures. The Plan should contain a clear statement regarding the Masters 
superseding authority and responsibility to make pronouncements concerning the security of 
the ship.  The plan should be written in the language or languages of the ship as well as make 
provisions for the three security levels.67
 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) approves SSPs for 




Regulation 10: Records 
Records should be retained for a period indicated by the Administration, be protected from 
unauthorised disclosure/access and be in a language or languages of the ship.  Records of the 
following undertakings are addressed in the Ship Security Plan and should be maintained on 
board the vessel: 
 Training, drills and exercises. 
 Security threats, security incidents, breaches of security. 
 Changes in security levels. 
 Communications relating to the direct security of the ship. 
                                                          
66 UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency ‘Maritime Safety and Working Conditions’ 2013 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/maritime-security (accessed on 07 October 2015) at 30. 
67ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 9 at 11-13. 
68 UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency op cit n 66 at 30. 
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 Internal audits and reviews of security activities. 
 Periodic review of the SSA and the SSP. 
 Implementation of any amendments to the plan. 
 Maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment.69
 
 
Regulation 11: Company Security Officer (CSO) 
The Company Security Officer is selected by the Company and based ashore with a threefold 
responsibility: firstly, to ensure that a Ship Security Assessment is duly conducted, secondly, 
that the Ship Security Plan is developed, approved, implemented and maintained. Thirdly, 




In the United Kingdom, it is a government requirement that Company Security Officers 




Regulation 12: Ship Security Officer 
Each ship should have a designated Ship Security Officer whose duties include enhancing 
security awareness, making sure that all security incidents are reported and that suitable 
training has been provided to shipboard personnel.72
 
This Ship Security Officer is also 
accountable to the Master for the security of the ship.  
Regulation 13: Training, Drills and Exercises on Ship Security 
Company Security Officer and the relevant shore-based personnel will receive training and be 
knowledgeable on security matters. Drills are to be carried out at appropriate intervals in 
order to ensure the effective application of the SSP. Company Security Officer shall further 
ensure effective coordination and implementation of the Ship Security Plan.73
                                                          
69ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 10 at 13. 
 In some 
countries the maritime port authorities endorse a particular maritime training service provider 
to ensure that their personnel is adequately prepared with the requisite skills and knowledge. 
As such, the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore has training providers that have been 
70Ibid at Regulation 11 at 14. 
71 UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency op cit n 66 at 30. 
72ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 12 at 15. 
73 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 13 at 15-16. 
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endorsed to conduct training as per the IMO model requirements and the ISPS Code. This 
training is for the benefit of the Company Security Officers (CSOs), Ship Security Officers 




The United Kingdom government has a list of approved training providers on their website 
and requires that the PFSO must complete a training course which has been approved by the 
Maritime and Transport Security (MTS) division, at the Department for Transport (DfT).75
 
 
Regulation 14: Port Facility Security  
Contracting Governments are responsible to set the security levels. Security procedures and 
measures are to be instituted, so as to result in minimum interference with or delay to ship’s 
personnel and visitors, passengers, ship, goods and services.76
 
 
Regulation 15: Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 
The Port Facility Security Assessment is the crucial part of the process of creating and 
updating the Port Facility Security Plan. The Assessment is to be conducted by the 
Contracting Government or allocated Recognised Security Organization with the appropriate 
skills.77 The Port Facility Security Assessment is to be reviewed and updated periodically in 
order to accommodate for threat level changes as well as minor changes in the port facility.78
 
 
It further identifies and evaluates the current existing threats, the current security measures 
that are in place and the important infrastructure and assets that require protection. 
Regulation 16: Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
The PFSP is to be created and sustained based on the conclusion of the Port Facility Security 
Assessment for each port. The Port Facility Security Officer is responsible for the 
development as well as the revision of the PFSP. Provisions are made in the Port Facility 
                                                          
74 Maritime Port Authority of Singapore op cit n 12. 
75 UK Department of Transport ‘Security Training Requirements in UK Ports for Staff and Approved Training 
Providers’ 2012 available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/security-training-for-staff-working-in-ports (accessed 
on 06 October 2015). 
76ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 14 at 16-17. 
77 Ibid at Regulation 15 at 17-18. 
78 IMO op cit n 43. 
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Security Plan for the three security levels. The Contracting Government is required to 
approve the PFSP.  The PFSP is to be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure.79
 
 
The role of the PFSP is to make sure that the security measures developed are applied in 
order to safeguard the ships and port facility from risks of security incidents. In the United 
States of America, the Coast Guard, the agency that is responsible for vessel and facility 
security examines the high-risk foreign vessels and is tasked with the responsibility of 
ensuring that all visiting foreign vessels comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code.80
In Canada, the PFSP is named the Marine Facility Security Plan and is approved by Transport 
Canada Marine Safety and Security. The Marine Facility Security Officers is tasked with 
maintaining and updating the plans.
  
81
Regulation 17: Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) 
  
The Port Facility Security Officer is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring the Port 
Facility Security Plan is developed, implemented, revised, maintained and liaised with the 
Company Security Officers and the Ship Security Officers. There should be a Port Facility 
Security Officer assigned to each port facility and be provided the necessary support to fulfil 
the duties. There is a list of responsibilities and duties that is allocated to the PFSO, this 
includes development, maintenance and implementation of the PFSP, inspection of the port 
facility, conducting security survey and enhancing security awareness of personnel.82
The PFSO play a significant role in maritime security, as illustration, in New Zealand, the 
PFSO are informed of international developments as well as issues as they develop, they also 
form part of the committee chaired by the Maritime Safety Authority, a platform for 




   
                                                          
79 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 16 at 18-19. 
80 American Association of Port Authority ‘Five Years After 9/11 Attacks: U.S. Ports More Secure Than Ever; 
Progress must Continue’ (2006) available at http://www.aapa-ports.org/Press/PRDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=1092 
accessed on 07 October 2015. 
81 Port of Belledune, Canada ‘Port Security’ available at http://www.portofbelledune.ca/security.php accessed 
on 07 October 2015.  
82ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 17 at 19-20. 
83 P William ‘The Implementation of the ISPS Code in New Zealand and Regional Issues for Discussion’ 
Presented to the government by the Deputy Director Safety and Response Services Maritime Safety Authority 
available at 
http://www.amsa.gov.au/aphomsa/archives/Meeting%207/Agenda%20Item%202%20Maritime%20Security/Im
plementation%20of %20IsPS%20Code(NZ).pdf (accessed on 15 September 2015) at 4. 
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Regulation 18: Training Drills and Exercises on Port Facility Security 
The PFSO and port facility security personnel have to be trained and should have the 
requisite knowledge to conduct the required training drills and exercises at appropriate 
intervals. Drills ought to take place at least every three months. Exercises should be carried 
out annually. IMO currently provides guidance on training and certification for Port Facility 
Security Officers by means of the Maritime Security Circular 1/Circ.1188.84
 
 
Some States are proactive in ensuring standardised training is made available to their security 
personnel at various ports. This is illustrated in New Zealand, where the Maritime Authority, 
facilitates centralised training in order to ensure all are on the same level of understanding. In 
addition, it has developed port and ship planning guidelines that have been distributed to ship 
and port companies. 85
 
  
Regulation 19: Verification and Certification for Ships 
This section provides an understanding on verifications, issue and endorsement of certificate, 
duration and validity of certificate and interim certification.  
 
 Initial Verification will comprise of a complete verification of its security system, 
associated security equipment and the approved SSP. There should be a satisfactory 
condition and fit for the service.  
 
 Renewal Verification should not surpass five years. The security system and any related 
security equipment should be in compliance with the requirements. There should be a 
satisfactory condition and fit for service. 
 
 Intermediate Verification consist of the inspection of system for security and any 
associated security equipment with a minimum of one intermediate verification, if one 
only, it will occur between the second and third anniversary date. 
 
 Additional Verification as determined by the Administration.86
                                                          
84 IMO op cit n 43. 
 
85 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 17 at 19-20. 
86 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 13 at Regulation 19 at 21-25. 
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Appendix 1: Form of the International Ship Security Certificate – also containing additional 
endorsements if needed (See Annexure 5). 
Appendix 2: Form of the Interim International Ship Security Certificate (See Annexure 6). 
2.6.2  Part B of the ISPS Code  
Part B is non-mandatory but recommendatory; it sets out guidelines on how the mandatory 
requirements of Part A might best be complied with. It essentially fleshes out the contents of 
Part A. This part is divided into 19 Regulations and 2 Appendixes. 
Regulation 1: Introduction 
The introduction includes the preamble of this Code and it provides guidance on the 
following: 
 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments: There is a list of responsibilities that 
include the approval of the Ship Security Plans as well as the exercise of control and 
compliance measures. In addition, there is an exclusion list detailing duties or 
activities that cannot be delegated to a Recognised Security Organisation.87
 
 
 Setting the Security Level: There is an elaboration of the three security levels. 
 
 The Company and the Ship: The Company must designate a Company Security 
Officer (CSO) and one Ship Security Officer per ship. 
 
 The Port Facility: Port Facility Security Assessments is essentially a risk analysis that 
has to be completed by each Contracting Government. This section details the content 
of the assessment, it assists in the determination of which port facilities will be 




 Information and Communication: Information is to be made accessible to allow for 
effective communication between the Contracting Governments as well as between 
                                                          
87ISPS Code, Part B op cit n 39 at Regulation 1 at 31-35. 
88Ibid at Regulation 1 at 34. 
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Company/SSO and the Port Facility Security Officers. The Contracting Governments 
are also required to make available certain information to the IMO.89
 
 
Regulation 2: Definitions 
There is no guidance provided regarding definitions in chapter XI-2 or part A of the ISPS 
Code however there is an elaboration of section, paragraph and Contracting Government.  
 
Regulation 3: Application 
This section provides guidance on ships and port facilities. The provisions of the ISPS Code 
do not apply to port facilities intended and utilised predominantly for military purposes.90
 
 
Regulation 4: Responsibilities of Contracting Governments 
The following responsibilities of the Contracting Government are detailed: 
 Security of Assessments and Plans 
 Designated Authorities 
 Recognized Security Organizations 
 Setting security levels 
 Contact points and information on Port Facility Security Plans 
 Identification documents 
 Fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location 
 Ships which are not required to comply with Part A of this Code 
 Threats to ships and other incidents at sea 
 Alternative security agreements 
 Equivalent arrangements for port facilities 
 Manning level 
 Control and compliance measures 
 Control of ships in port 
 Ships intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government 
 Additional provisions 
 Non-party ships and ships below convention size91
 
 
                                                          
89Ibid. 
90 Ibid at Regulation 3 at 35. 
91 ISPS Code, Part B op cit n 39 at Regulation 4 at 36-46. 
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Regulation 5: Declaration of Security (DoS) 
The foremost purpose of the Declaration of Security is to ensure consensus between the 
relevant role-players regarding security measures. Completion of a DoS is required:  
 In the event of the Contracting Government of the port facility or ship considering it 
to be required.  
 The PFSA results may also indicate that a DoS is required whilst the reasons and 
circumstances for a DoS ought to be set out in the PFSP.  
 A ship or its Administration may request a DoS. 
 Port Facility Security Officer may initiate a DoS.92
 
 
Regulation 6: Obligations of the company 
The Company is accountable for submitting information to the Master of the ship. The 
information is to comply with the requirements of the Company and include those 
responsible for appointing shipboard personnel as well as deciding on the employment of 
ship. 
 
Regulation 7: Ship Security  
Guidance is contained in sections 8, 9 and 13 of the ISPS Code. 
 
Regulation 8: Ship Security Assessment (SSA) 
This section specifies the requirements when a SSA is being conducted as well as what the 
SSA should entail. Company Security Officer (CSO) is held accountable for carrying out the 
SSA and is required to utilise expert assistance in the process. The Company Security Officer 
is mandated to acquire and record the required information for conducting an assessment. 
This section provides a list of the required information and details on the on-scene survey. 
The details of what should be considered part of the SSA are listed in this section and 
include: 
 Each identified point of access should be examined in the SSA  
 Significance of the current measures of security 
 Persons, services, activities, and operations that it is essential to safeguard 
 All possible threats 
 All possible vulnerabilities93
                                                          




Regulation 9: Ship Security Plan (SSP) 
This is a comprehensive 11 page guideline on the Ship Security Plan. It begins with the 
preparation of the SSP, the various role players involved in the process of its submission for 
approval and most importantly the details that should be covered in the SSP.  
 
The preparation and submission for approval of a SSP is the responsibility of the relevant 
CSO whilst the Administration provides guidance on the content and preparatory work of the 
SSP. All SSPs should detail the following: 
 Organizational structure of security for ship 
 Ships relationships with various roles players regarding security responsibilities such 
as Company, port facilities, relevant authorities and other ships 
 Communication systems 
 Basic security measures for security various levels 
 Reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Governments94
 
 
This regulation further provides for details regarding each security level applicable, on the 
following: 
 Organization and performance of ship security duties 
 Access to the ship 
 Restricted areas on the ship and what they may include 
 Handling of cargo 
 Delivery of ships stores 
 Handling unaccompanied baggage 
 Monitoring the Security of the Ship 
 Differing security levels 
 Activities not covered by the Code 
 Declarations of security 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
93Ibid at Regulation 8 at 48-52. 
94Ibid at Regulation 9 at 52-63. 
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Regulation 10: Records 
Records should be retained in any format with the objective of preventing unauthorised 
disclosure/access. This regulation stipulates that Contracting Governments duly authorised 




Regulation 11: Company Security Officer 
Direction is contained in sections 8, 9 and 13. 
 
Regulation 12: Ship Security Officer 
Direction is mentioned in sections 8, 9 and 13. 
 
Regulation 13: Training, Drills and Exercises on Ship Security 
This section details in a form of lists, the training requirements for the Ship Security Officer 
(SSO), Company Security Officer (CSO) and shore based Company personnel. It is 
comprehensive in outlining the specific training requirements for all relevant 
authorities/institutions.96
 security administration 
  The training includes the following: 
 international conventions 
 Government legislation 
 ship and port facility security measures 
 techniques of conducting inspection, audits, monitoring and control  
 
Regulation 14: Port Facility Security 
Direction contained in section 15, 16 and 18. 
 
Regulation 15: Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 
The relevant Contracting Government ought to provide approval for a completed PFSA 
whilst a RSO may conduct the PFSA. This regulation provides a list of elements that a PFSA 
should attend to within a port facility and it includes the physical security, procedural 
policies, utilities, structural integrity, radio and telecommunication systems. 
 
                                                          
95 ISPS Code, Part B op cit n 39 at Regulation 10 at 63. 
96 Ibid at Regulation 13 at 64 -66. 
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Regulation 16: Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
This regulation is very detailed in its 14 page guidance on the Port Facility Security Plan. It 
begins with the preparatory stage of a PFSP, detailing the requirements of the plan and the 
details of what it should contain. It further elaborates on those accountable for the preparation 
of the plan as well as the Contracting Governments responsibilities in this regard.  
 
The PFSO is accountable for the preparation of the PFSP and the content of each PFSP is 
customised according to the circumstance of each port facility. The Contracting Governments 
responsible for formulating advice on the content, preparing of a PFSP, developing 
techniques to measure the effectiveness of each PFSP and approving the PFSP.97
The PFSA will establish the necessity to appoint a PFSP and to formulate a PFSP as it 
contains amongst others the details of potential security risks and particular structures of the 
port facility that warrants the services of a PFSO. The PFSP will require for the appropriate 
security measures to be established and national security to be considered in order to 
minimise the probability of a security breach.  
  
PFSPs should provide for: 
 Detail security organization of the port facility 
 Organisations associations with other relevant authorities 
 Detail basic security level 1 in place 
 Detail additional security measures of security level 2 and security level 3 
 Consistent review, or PFSP audit  
 Reporting procedures to appropriate Contracting Governments  
 
Guidance is further provided on each security level requirements for various actions such as 
access to the facility of the port, cargo management, delivery of ships stores, restricted areas, 
unaccompanied baggage management and differing security levels.98
 
 
Regulation 17: Port Facility Security Officer 
The Port Facility Security Officer should in exceptional circumstances assist when the Ship 
Security Officer has concerns relating to the validity of documents of identification of those 
                                                          
97 Ibid at Regulation 16 at 71-85. 
98ISPS Code, Part B op cit n 39 at Regulation 16 at 82-83. 
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that intend to board the ship for official purposes. 99
 
 This Officer should not be accountable 
for routine confirmation of those intending to board the ship. Furthermore, sections 15, 16 
and 18 provides the relevant guidance. 
Regulation 18: Training Drills and Exercises on Port Facility Security 
Regulation 18 firstly provides a very detailed list of 20 areas of training that the Port Facility 
Security Officer should receive training and be knowledgeable on security administration, 
methodologies for audits, inspection, control as well as monitoring, government legislation 
and regulations.  
 
It secondly provides another list of 10 areas of training that the Port Facility personnel that 
have security responsibilities should receive training and be knowledgeable on some of the 
following: current security patterns and threats, security related communications, methods 
utilised to evade security processes, inspection, control, and monitoring techniques.100
 
 
Finally this regulation, has a section on drills, which should be conducted on a minimum 
basis of every three months and exercises with the objective of ensuring proficiency at all 




Regulation 19: Verification and Certification for Ships 
There is no further guidance provided in Part B. It can be deduced that this is so, since Part A, 
Regulation 19 is comprehensive in providing detailed guidelines on the process of 
verification and certification for ships. 
 
Appendix 1: Form of a Declaration of Security between a Ship and a Port Facility (See 
Annexure 7). 
 
Appendix 2: Form of a Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility (See Annexure 8). 
 
 
                                                          





2.7  Conclusion  
 
The provisions of the ISPS Code create a platform for the international maritime community 
to be on the same level in terms of securing its ports, facilities and ships. Part A contains 
mandatory provisions whilst Part B contains specific guidelines for each regulation that may 
be utilised by states during the drafting stages of their own domestic maritime security 
legislations.  
 
The application of the ISPS Code is of vital importance as it will enhance national and 
international security, as the security of the maritime environment is a transnational 
challenge, which requires regional and international efforts. Apart from providing protection 
against terrorists and other criminal acts, these new security measures, enhance the efficiency 
of the maritime industry by the: 
 Reduction in delays 
 Quicker processing times 
 Improved asset control 
 Reduced losses due to theft 
 Decrease in insurance costs102
In conclusion the ISPS Code provisions are comprehensive in providing guidance on how to 
enhance maritime security. However it is essential that the process of implementation of these 
provisions is carried out in order to ensure that the shipping industry is protected and 
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CHAPTER 3: MARITIME SECURITY AND TERRORISM  
3.1 Introduction  
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the concept of maritime security has expanded and maritime 
terrorism is recognised as a new threat to maritime security due to its blatant disregard of the 
generally accepted principle of freedom of the seas, impeding travel by sea, restricting the 
transportation of people and goods and the economic activities in various trading ports and 
sea routes around the world.103
It is internationally accepted that maritime terrorism is a transnational threat to international 
maritime trade. As such, the definitions of maritime terrorism utilised by different countries 




Authors at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at the University of London 
identified two types of maritime terrorism namely: political and economic. Political maritime 
terrorism can be either carried out by the state or non-state organisations, whilst economic 
terrorism can be carried out with the use of violence such as human trafficking or without the 
use of violence such as the illegal transportation of contraband arms or drugs. 
 The United Nations defines maritime terrorism as “any 
action.....that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain 
from doing any act.”  
105
Studies indicate that international maritime terrorism incidents are mainly as a result of the 
actions of terrorist groups that are recognised of having maritime capability, it include Al-





This chapter discusses maritime terrorism on an international level relating to incidents 
before the implementation of the ISPS Code and after the implementation of the ISPS Code 
                                                          
103 V Bezkorovainiy and S Sokolyuk ‘Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Disorder at Sea’ (2012) Corbett Paper No 
8 at The Corbett Centre for Maritime Studies at 4 available at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/dsd/research/researchgroups/corbett/corbettpaper8.pdf (accessed on 03 
July 2015). 
104 A Mazaheri ‘How ISPS Code affects Ports and Port Activities’ (2008), a Thesis submitted to the University 
College of Boras in Sweden at 8 available at (accessed on 15 July 2015). 




in order to evaluate the success of the ISPS Code. The evidence is strong and it will illustrate 
that the ISPS Code is beneficial to the security of the maritime environment.  
 
3.2 International Maritime Terrorism Incidents: Before the ISPS Code  
Maritime history recorded one of its first acts of terrorism in 1961107 however only in 
October 1985, with the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro being hijacked, did the international 
maritime community react with preventative measures. The IMO responded to this incident 
with the Resolution A.584 (14), which are measures to prevent unlawful acts that threaten the 
security of passengers and crew as well as the safety of ships. IMO also issued in 1986 
Circ.443 on measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crew on board ships.108 
Shortly afterward, the IMO developed and adopted the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). This Convention provides 
that the appropriate action is instituted against those persons who commit acts of 
unlawfulness against ships.109
In addition during 1986, a study regarding maritime terrorism was requested by the UN 
General Assembly. The outcome of the study resulted in the IMO adopting MSC/Circ. 443 
which were recommendations on measures to prevent unlawful acts against crew and 




The IMO held a Diplomatic Conference in December 2002, focusing on the prevention and 
suppression of acts of maritime terrorism and identifying methods of enhancing global 
maritime security. During this conference, a number of amendments were adopted to the 
SOLAS Convention, including the ISPS Code, the additional requirements for ships to 
standardise ship identification markings, fit Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and to 
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1961: Santa Maria - On 23 January 1961, a 609 foot long, 20,900 ton Portuguese luxury 
cruise liner with 600 passengers and 300 crew on board was seized and controlled by a group 
of 24 members of the Portuguese and Spanish opposition movement who had boarded the 
ship with weapons hidden in their luggage. The opposition movement members eventually 
surrendered to the Brazilian authorities and were granted political asylum.112
1973: Sounion - In March 1973, in Lebanon, a Greek passenger ship Sounion sank in the 
Beirut port. Whilst the ship was docked, the Palestinian terrorists, attached a limpet mine to 
the hull of the ship. The terrorist planned on blowing up the ship once it was at sea however 
due to Swedish intelligence, the departure was delayed in order to allow for the passengers on 





1985: Achille Lauro - On 7 October 1985, the Italian liner Achille Lauro, while sailing from 
Alexandria to Ashdod, Israel was hijacked by four men who were part of the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF), this incident was recorded as one of the first terrorist acts in maritime 
history.114
1985: Rainbow Warrior – In July 1985, the Greenpeace ship was moored in New Zealand, 
preparing to confront French nuclear testing in the Moruroa Atoll
 
115 when two explosions 
ripped through its hull, killing one crew member.116 The two explosions was as a result of 
two bombs planted by the French Secret Service agents.117
The response received from the international community on maritime terrorism was reflected 
in the IMO adopting the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), and the 1988 Rome Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
  
                                                          
112D Bryant ‘Hijacking of the SS Santa Maria’ (2011) Maritime Professional available at 
http://www.maritimeprofessional.com/blogs/post/hijacking-of-the-ss-santa-maria-13422War II (accessed on 30 
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Continental Shelf.118 The SUA Convention was intended to ensure that responsible 




1990: The Tamil Tigers Acts of Maritime Terrorism - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam with the Sea Tigers brigade120 was involved in maritime terrorism during the civil war 
period between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers.121 The Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam has since July 1990 been involved in over 40 maritime terrorism attacks.122
Post 9/11 
  
2000: USS Cole - On 12 October 2000, the US Navy vessel, Cole, while refuelling at a port 
in Aden, Yemen, was attacked by two suicide bombers navigating a small motor boat full of 
explosives. This incident resulted in the death of 17 crew members whilst 39 others were 
injured. An Al-Qaeda supported terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack.123
2002: Limburg - In October 2002, the French owned crude oil tanker, the MV Limburg was 
reported by BBC as carrying 397 000 barrels of crude oil and was attacked by Al-Qaeda 
suicide bombers whilst in Yemen. An explosive-laden boat struck tanker’s hull which 
resulted in an explosion killing one crew member, injuring 12 people and spilling 100 000 
barrels of oil. A Saudi national admitted to his involvement in the attacks and pleaded guilty 




2004: Superferry 14 - In February 2004, a Philippines ferry was attacked by the Abu-Sayyaf 
terrorist group which resulted in the death of 116 persons. The explosion resulted from a 
 
                                                          
118 D C Turack ‘Maritime Terrorism and International Law’ (1992) 41 (2) The International and Comparative 
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hidden television set in the vessel that contained a 4 kilogram TNT time bomb.125 This 
incident is considered the most serious act of maritime terrorism due to the number of deaths 
that resulted from this attack.126
As outlined in a paper by Bezkorovainiy and Sokolyuk dated 2012, a number of distinctive 
characteristics emanate from all these incidents of international maritime terrorism: 
  
• Trained concurring crew members are used for conducting maritime terrorist attacks; 
• Valuable and hi-tech weaponry such as the long-range weapons and explosives are 
used; 
• Criminals carrying out the act of maritime terrorism are part of larger notorious 
grouping/maritime terrorist group.127
These incidents of maritime terrorism display the potential susceptibility of maritime vessels 
to terrorist attacks. The catastrophe of the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused the international 
maritime society to realise the possibility of a vessels loaded with weapons of mass 





 In view of such threats, anti-terrorism regulations such as the ISPS Code 
were introduced for implementation by states in order to provide protection to their vessels 
and port facility and enhance maritime security globally.  
3.3 International Maritime Terrorism Incidents: After the ISPS Code  
2005: Don Ramon – An Al-Qaeda linked group of terrorist attacked a passenger ship in 
Filipino waters. They placed a time bomb in the ship’s galley, beneath gas cylinders, this 
explosion resulted in the sinking of the ship and 30 injured passengers.129
2010: M Star - In July 2010, the Japanese oil tanker M Star in the Strait of Hormuz was 
attacked using explosives to damage the hull of the vessel. Two days later, the Brigades of 
Abdullah Azzam, an Al-Qaeda linked militant group claimed responsibility for the attack.
  
130
                                                          
125 ‘Superferry 14 Fire leaves 116 dead’ (2014) available at 
 
www.terrorism.com/2014/04/23/superferry-14-fires-
leaves-116-dead/ (accessed on 01 July 2015). 
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2013: Cosco Asia - In September 2013, a Chinese owned vessel was attacked with a rocket 
propelled grenade while on transit in the Suez Canal as reported by Turkey Sea News. 131 An 
Islamist group Al-Furqan claimed accountability for this attack.132 Fortunately, the attack 
resulted in minor damages to the vessel and no casualties, this attack was on a small scale, 
however, due to the economic importance of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian Government plans 
to increase its security by building a protective wall along the Canal. 133
3.4  Increasing security levels of the ISPS Code  
  
Evidence that the protective framework and guidelines offered by the ISPS Code is being 
globally utilised by states for the protection of their vessels against acts of terrorism can be 
seen in an increase in the ISPS security levels by various states in order to counter threats of 
potential terrorist attacks. Notably, in August 2013, the United Kingdom increased its ISPS 
security level from Level 1 to Level 3 for all British flagged ships in the territorial waters of 
Yemen due to an increase in Al-Qaeda attacks; during June – July 2013, pre-empting possible 
terrorist attacks, the Indian government raised its security level at some ports to Level 2.134
The international maritime community recognises maritime terrorism as a rapidly growing 
threat to global maritime security and various international initiatives are underway to 
enhance maritime security.  As such, partner states of the Five Power Defence Arrangements 
(FPDA), which includes New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, Australia and Malaysia 
agreed to include maritime terrorism as a security threat in their military exercises.
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3.5  Conclusion  
Research indicates that due to the implementation of the ISPS code, there has been an 
increase in the awareness and implementation of maritime safety and security measures by 
member states. There has also been a decrease in reported incidents of serious acts of 
maritime terrorism in the last ten years.136  These positive outcomes stemming from the 
implementation of the ISPS Code is evidence of its success in fulfilling its objectives.137  As 
stated by Author Lars H. Bergqvist, Swedish Master Mariner and a Reserve Officer in the 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF THE ISPS CODE  
 
4.1 Introduction  
South Africa continues to be the largest economy on the continent139 and in order to maintain 
this status it is key to ensure the efficiency of the ports. Maintaining the ISPS Code is of 
utmost importance as it safeguards that foreign trade relations are maintained and this ensures 
the growth of the South African economy.  As stated by the CEO of Transnet National Port 
Authority “The efficient running of ports is important to the well-being of the economy of 
South Africa.”140
This chapter will illustrate the implementation of the ISPS Code in South Africa, evaluate the 
implications/risks of non-compliance and how South African ports mitigate these risks. 
Thereafter a mini comparative study will illustrate the implementation of the ISPS Code in 
various other signatory countries to SOLAS such as Sweden, Singapore, Iran, United 
Kingdom, Cyprus, and Germany in order to determine its impact. The core question of 
whether the ISPS Code has fulfilled its purpose will be answered together with 
recommendations for IMO to improve its mandate of maritime security.   
  
4.2 Implementation of the ISPS Code in South Africa  
South Africa, being signatory to the IMO, ratified the ISPS Code and implemented its 
provisions via the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations 2004, hereafter 
referred to Regulations 2004.141  All eight main commercial ports in South Africa namely 
Richard Bay, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Mossel Bay, Saldanha Bay, Ngqura and 
Cape Town142 are in compliance with Regulations 2004 and the ISPS Code since 29 June 
2004.143
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The designated authority144 for the administration of maritime security in South Africa is the 
South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA),145
- Approval of Ship Security Plans  
 which is responsible for:  
- Verification of compliance with plans 
- Issuing the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) 
- Issuing the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)146
 
 
SAMSA is further mandated in terms of section 2 of the SAMSA Act 5, to give effect to 
various legislation relating to the maritime environment and it includes: The Merchant 
Shipping Act, Marine Traffic Act and the Ship Registration Act, 1998. Additionally, when 
necessary, SAMSA issues marine notices147
4.2.1  Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulation 2004  
 with the aim of providing guidance to the 
industry on the application of the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations 2004 
and the ISPS Code. 
To obtain a better understanding of the provisions of Regulations 2004, there will be an 
analysis of the breakdown of the functionality of certain provisions of Regulations 2004, 
identification of the risks that would emerge as a result of non-compliance and control 
methods adopted at the South African ports to mitigate the risks.  
Part 1: Preliminary 
Section 5: Unlawful interference with maritime transport148
The non-compliance of this provision of unlawful interference with maritime transport may 
result in South Africa losing its credibility in two-ways. Firstly in-terms of the ISPS Code and 
secondly with regard to bi-lateral trading agreements which would lead to financial loss.
                                                                
149
                                                          
144 ISPS Code, Part A op cit n 12 at section 4.2 at 36. 
 
Should this occur, South African ports would be considered as high risk ports and foreign 
145 SAMSA was established on 01 April 1998 under the SAMSA Act 5 of 1998, the objectives of the Authority 
are to ensure safety of life and property at sea, prevent and combat pollution from ships in the marine 
environment and promote the Republic’s maritime interest. This is according to the SAMSA Act 5 of 1998, 
Objectives at 8.  
146SAMSA Marine Notice 12 of 2008 and the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004. 
147 An example would be the Marine Notice No.12 of 2008 which provides the maritime industry with guidance 
on the application of the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004 and the ISPS Code. Specific 
guidance is provided on various maritime security related matters including: Certification of South African 
Ships, Security Level in South African Territorial Waters and Port Security. 
148 Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations 2004, Section 5 at 13. 
149 TNPA Compliance Control Plan for the Maritime Security Regulations 2013, Division 5 at 1. 
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vessels would be reluctant to engage in the business at these ports.150  This situation would 
ultimately become detrimental to the growth of the economy of the country as the efficient 
running of the ports is vital to the economy of South Africa.151
 
 
In an effort to maintain the ISPS Code status and mitigate the risks posed by non-compliance 
of this provision, South African ports implement strict control measures within designated 
port limits, and on land all port users using the marine environment are searched, and their 
purpose of visits are verified.152  Then on the land side, Border Police conducts coastal and 
waterfront patrols in an effort to provide safe seas, and prevent piracy.153
Section 13: Complying with Security Directions 
 
Non-compliance with security directions may result in the compromising of the ISPS Code 
status of the Ports in South Africa. To retain South Africa’s status and be regarded as a safe 
port to conduct business, before a vessel docks, the Port Security Manager establishes 
through the Department of Transport that a vessel has obtained clearance.154
 
  
Part 2: Maritime Security Levels and Security Directions 
Sections 16, 17 & 18: Security level 1 applies to South Africa’s eight main commercial 
ports.155 Any change in security levels must be declared by the Director General for 
Transport and will it be notified by Notices to Mariners, Navigational Warning and Marine 
Notices.156 The Director General for Transport is required to consult with National 




In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of Part 2 as well as maintaining the ISPS 
Code status and to be regarded as a safe port, there is constant communication with the 
Department of Transport for the verification that vessels have been granted clearance. This 
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verification ensures that the vessels that are docking are safe and does not pose any risk to 
other vessels and the port so that the security level declared is maintained.158
 
   
Section 23: Notifying maritime security level 2 and 3 declarations and revocations159
The risk of non-compliance to this provision would be a definite loss of business from 
maritime participants from foreign countries as their vessels may be compromised due to the 
failure to notify them on the change of levels of security.
 
160 In order to mitigate this risk of 
non-compliance and in an effort to maintain trading relations with foreign countries, ports in 
South Africa liaise with all port users about any change in the levels of security.161 This 
provision is important as non-compliance will also damage the reputation of South Africa; 
therefore should a port operator fail to comply with this provision, the port operator will be 
committing an offence and will be either liable for a fine or will be imprisoned.162
 
  
In addition, for vessels that seek information on maritime security and for vessels that are 
arriving on the South African coast, there is a National Contact Point for their usage, namely 
the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) which is situated in Cape Town.163
 
  
Part 3: Maritime Security Plans 
According to Section 39, there is an obligation for the maritime industry participants i.e. port 
service providers, port operators and port facility operators to have a security plan which 
should be revised every five years.164 These security plans together with an attached security 
risk assessment is required to be submitted to the Department of Transport for review and its 
approval.165 Non-compliance with this provision, that is, failure of maritime participants 
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Part 4: Ship Security Plans and International Ship Security Certificates 
It is a requirement according to Section 57 of Regulations 2004 that all South African 
regulated ships have a Ship Security Plan and an International Ship Security Certificate. 
Section 62 provides the requirements of a Ship Security Plan and it must include: 
• A Ship Security Assessment.  
• Security measures that is to be applied according to the security level of the ship. 
• Ship Security Officers details. 
Further detailed guideline for the development of the Ship Security Plan is contained in 
Section 63 of the Regulations. Compliance to this provision is vital as failure to comply is an 
offence which is punishable.167  Furthermore the plan is required to be revised every five 
years.168
Part 5: Foreign Regulated Ships 
 The Transnet Maritime School of Excellence provides maritime training to the 
maritime personnel in South Africa on the compilation of the Ship Security Plan. 
Section 85 of the Regulations places an obligation on foreign-regulated ship to obtain an 
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) or its equivalent as well as to carry on board 
the vessel its ship security records. Furthermore foreign regulated ships are required to:  
• Provide pre-arrival information169
• Allow for inspections to be carried out on the vessel
 so that the vessel obtains clearance. 
170
• Comply with security levels
 to mitigate the risk of a 
maritime threat. 
171
Part 6: Powers of Officials 
 to maintain South Africa’s declared security levels. 
This section provides a list of authorised officers, namely: surveyor, proper officer, member 
designated by the Director General (Department of Transport, The State Security Agency, the 
South African Defence Force and the South African Police Service).172
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officers are provided with a list of duties to perform in order of ensuring compliance with this 
regulation, these duties include:173
• Inspection of the vessel, its records and other documentation
 
174






The emerging risk of non-compliance of sections 98 and 99 would result in conflict of 
interest within government departments involved and this may result in operational 
disruptions in the ports.176 South African, ports in an effort to prevent such risks, have the 
roles of the government departments clearly defined and implemented during their monthly 
Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC).177
Part 7: Reporting Maritime Transport Security Incidents 
  
Section 103 explains that a maritime transport security incident may be defined as a threat of 
unlawful interference/an unlawful interference with maritime transport. A list is provided on 
the persons responsible for reporting security incidents, such persons include: port facility 
operators, ship operators, ship masters, port operators, and employees of the maritime 




The failure to report incidents as required by this provision may result in the compromising 
of the status of the ISPS Code and security of the ports which will negatively impact on the 
business. South African ports mitigate this risk by implementing a requirement that the Port 
Facility Security Officer is mandated to report incidents within 24 hours. In addition the 
monthly engagements of the BCOCC further addresses the security incidents reported.180
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Part 8: Information-gathering 
The Director General may require security compliance information in writing, orally or by 
electronic means, which should be forth-coming from those requested.181 Any refusal without 
a good reason, supplying of false or misleading information will amount to an offence which 
is punishable by either a fine or imprisonment.182
 
 The risk of providing false information will 
result in reputational damage to South Africa and threaten the status of the ISPS Code. South 
Africa ports have mitigated this risk by stating that non-compliance is an offence which is 
punishable. 
4.3 The Impact of the ISPS Code in South Africa  
According to Transnet National Port Authority, a division of Transnet SOC Ltd there has 
been both a positive impact as well as a negative impact of the application of the ISPS Code 
on specifically port operations.183
 
  
Positive impact on port operations: 
 Consistency in maritime security as the Security policies and measures procedures 
have been standardised with the requirements in Regulations 2004. 
 The handling of the vessel clearance process has been improved. 
 A decrease in the crime rate at the ports with the increase in security measures and 
restricted access policy being implemented.  




Negative impact on port operations: 
 Vessel clearances delays.  
 Traffic congestions into and out of the Port/ Facility entrance points, specifically on 
uncertainty regarding privately-owned port facilities as well as some resistance in 
terms of co-operation with measures procedures and security policies. However South 
Africa mitigates these challenges in the SA Maritime Transport Security Bill.185
                                                          
181 Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations op cit n 148 at section 116 at 59. 
 
182 Ibid at section 116(5) at 59. 
183 TNPA Presentation on Status Report on Port Security in South Africa - 2009 available on website of Port 
Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa http://www.pmaesa.org (accessed on 17 April 2015). 




Identified short coming in the ISPS Code: 
 The ISPS Code is limited in terms of its application of vessels186, it is not applicable 
to fishing vessels, and government owned or operated vessels or vessels engaged 
exclusively in local trade within one state.187
 
 
Transnet National Port Authority, specifically the Compliance Division creates a Compliance 
Control Plan which is a document stipulating each provision in Merchant Shipping (Maritime 
Security) Regulation, the risk of non-compliance to the provision and the control measures in 
place to mitigate the risks. These security measures ensures that South African ports 
maintains their ISPS Code status and is regarded as a safe port.188
4.4   Impact of the ISPS Code on other Signatories to the SOLAS Convention  
   
Below is a brief discussion on the impact studies undertaken by various jurisdictions. The 
results are categorised as positive/strengths and negative/weakness/shortcomings experienced 
in the implementation of the ISPS Code within these jurisdictions.  Some countries like 
Singapore and the United Nations have not only identified the weaknesses but has taken the 
initiative to address the identified weaknesses.  
  
4.4.1 Sweden  
Sweden’s maritime administration requested for research to be conducted in 2009 to evaluate 
the impact of the implementation of the ISPS Code. This research comprised of 
questionnaires/surveys and interviews with questions relating to amongst others the 
advantages and disadvantages of the application of the ISPS Code and it was provided to 
maritime stakeholders, the shipping industry as well as the maritime administration for a 
response.189
 
 The results of the research indicated the following: 
Positive impact of the ISPS Code 
 Increased maritime security on-board ships as a result of access control measures in 
place.  
 Enhanced knowledge and increased awareness and understanding due to the increase 
in number of training and drills sessions on-board. 
                                                          
186 See Regulation 3 of the Part A of the ISPS Code. 
187C Forrest op cit n 24 at 14. 
188 Interview with a member of Transnet National Port Authority at the Port of Durban on 07 January 2016. 
189 P Hellberg, op cit n 48 at 54. 
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 Increase in safety and security of personnel and maritime environment as the incidents 




Negative impact of the ISPS Code 
 Ships were delayed due to their suppliers experiencing challenges during the security 
checks at the access points. 




Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) Singapore is considered to be one of the busiest ports in 
the world and in the year 2014 it has been recognised to have cumulatively handled 500 
million TEUs, which is a significant milestone as it is the first port in the world to have 
achieved this accolade.192  Singapore’s application of the ISPS Code is described as “one of 
the success stories” as its container ships were certified as ISPS compliant prior to the 
deadline, and its ships and port facilities conformed to the ISPS Code requirements by 01 
July 2004.193
In assessing the effectiveness of the ISPS Code in Singapore, the Geddes Paper
  
194 identified 
the restriction of the applicability of certain vessels types as a weakness of the ISPS Code, 
that its non-application to many vessels, can be exploited by terrorists.195
The strengths of the ISPS Code, identified in this research paper include: 
  
 The consistent approach utilised internationally regarding maritime security.  
 The mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code.  
 Cost savings from the reduction of pilferage and incidents of theft.196
Singapore implemented several of its supplementary security initiatives aimed at addressing 
the weakness of the ISPS Code i.e. only applicable to certain types of vessels. One such 
 
                                                          
190 Ibid at 62. 
191 Ibid at 62. 
192 PSA Singapore op cit n 12. 
193 CZ Raymond ‘The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security: An Assessment of the Implementation of the 
ISPS Code and Initial Responses as to its Effectiveness’(2004) Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 
Commentaries Singapore 62/2004 2 available at www.idss.edu.sg (accessed on 29 July 2015). 
194 F McNaught op cit n 111. 
195 Ibid at 93. 
196 Ibid at 94. 
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initiative is a ‘Ship Self-Security Assessment Checklist’ which small vessels (excluded from 
the ISPS Code) are mandated to complete and keep a copy on-board before actually entering 
the Singapore port waters.197 Another initiative is that of a Harbour Craft Security Code 
(HCSC) which mandates harbour craft to comply with general security standards.198  The 
HCSC comprises of practical security measures such as a prerequisite of the Master of a 
harbour craft to make entries in the Harbour Craft Log when conducting business and retain 
the log on-board for a minimum time of 3 months.199
4.4.3 Iran  
 These supplementary security initiatives 
have been implemented by the Singapore port authority in an effort to mitigate the risk posed 
by the restriction of the vessel type.    
The ISPS Code, has been successful as an anti-terrorism regulating mechanism, this is 
according to an empirical study conducted on the outcome of the implementation of the ISPS 
Code on the ports of Iran, in the area of Abadan, 200
 
  
This research concluded that the positive impacts of the ISPS Code include:  
 More accurate documentation as there are integrated standards for documents. 
 Increase in safety and security. 
 Lower danger risk. 
 Less incidents of smuggling and theft. 
 Improved control of cargo circulation, personnel and port area. 
 A more secure and safe working environment201
 
  
Whilst the negative impact of the ISPS Code include: 
 Slow work progress. 
 Increase in administration costs and paperwork 
 Various interpretations of the ISPS Code was identified as a weakness.202
 
 
                                                          
197 Maritime Port Authority of Singapore op cit n 12. This Ship Self-Security Assessment Checklist purpose is 
to benefit security of the crew and ship and to further ensure port is ready and prepared in terms of security for 
the entrance of small vessels.  
198 CZ Raymond op cit n 193. 
199 PSA Singapore website, available at https://www.singaporepsa.com/ (accessed on 15 January 2016). 
200 S N Saeedi, S Khodakhshi, H Jafari, ‘An Empirical Study on Effects of ISPS Code Implementation on Iran’s 
Port Activities’ (2012) ISSN 2322-2360 (7)  available at www.universalrg.org (accessed on 08 August 2015).  
201 Ibid at 2359. 
202 S N Saeedi, S Khodakhshi, H Jafari, op cit n 200 at 2359.  
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4.4.4  United Kingdom, Cyprus, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands  
Research conducted by Burmester at the United Kingdom Institute of Higher Education in 
Southampton on the application of the ISPS Code in the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Germany, 
Norway and the Netherlands indicated that much has been accomplished in terms of the 
objectives of the ISPS Code.203
 
  
However the following are some common shortcomings that were identified:  
 The various interpretations of the ISPS Code requirements. 
 Pre-arrival notifications need to be standardised. 
 Increase in paperwork.  
 Financial support required. 
 Exclusion of ships under 500gt. 
 Training should be clearly defined as well as included into the Standard Training 
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW 95) requirements in order to circumvent 
duplication of training.204
 
   
4.4.5  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Survey 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2007 conducted a 
compliance and impact study on the ISPS Code in the form of a global survey with the 
following objectives: 
 Establishment of the order and range of magnitude of the ISPS Code-related 
expenditures. 




                                                          
203 C Burmester “International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code – Perceptions and Reality of 
Shorebased and sea-going staff’ (2004) at 6 Southampton Institute of Higher Education, United Kingdom. 
204 Ibid. 
205 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Maritime Security: ISPS Code Implementation, 
Costs and related Financing’ (2007) UNCTAD Secretariat at 5 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf (accessed on 15 June 2015).  
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The outcome of the survey indicates the objectives of the ISPS Code has been accepted as 
legitimate by both the respondent ports and governments and there has been a general 
positive impression of the new security regime.206
 Improved business practices 
 
 Standardising risk assessment 
 Increased awareness 
 ICT usage and crime reduction 
 Streamlining processes207
The survey further indicates that the financial implications for implementing the ISPS Code 
vary between larger and smaller ports. To assist with financing, cooperation and partnership 
initiatives should be reinforced, such as technical assistance, financial support, capacity 
building, exchanging information.
 
208 Developing countries can be assisted through bilateral 
and regional arrangements as well IMO instruments such as the International Maritime 
Security Trust Fund209
 
 and Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme.  
4.5 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Research Findings  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has announced a “high degree of 
compliance” with the ISPS Code.210  Its reports indicated that the Contracting Governments 
had approved 97% of declared port facilities.211 In addition 89% of over 9000 declared port 
facilities have approved Port Facility Plans whilst 90% of ships that are obligated to be in 
compliance with the ISPS Code have been issued with their International Ship Security 
Certificates.212
                                                          
206 Ibid. 
 These Member States have with their designated authority implemented the 
ISPS Code via their domestic legislation.  
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid at 41. 
209Established in June 2003 to assist IMO to respond to requests for technical assistance on issues of maritime 
security, various governments contribute to the Fund including: United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, 
Denmark, the Russian Federation, and Germany.      
210 International Maritime Organization IMO: Security compliance shows continued improvement. Latest 
Press Briefing on August 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=892&doc_id=3760 (accessed on 29 July 2016). 
211 F McNaught op cit n 111. 
212 CZ Raymond op cit n 193 at 2. Statistics also available at International Maritime Organization IMO: Security 
compliance shows continued improvement. Latest Press Briefing on August 6, 2004, available at 
(http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=892&doc_id=3760 (accessed on 29 July 2015). 
50 
 
Specific focus is given to the IMO, due to the significant role it has played in the maritime 
industry and the direction it provides to the international maritime community. In addition a 
number of knowledgeable persons on the maritime security environment from the IMO have 
conducted research and assessments relating to the ISPS Code and its impact on the 
international maritime community. This section will focus on two papers written by 
prominent members of the IMO, the first paper (Senior Deputy Director Captain Hartmut G. 
Hesse) is research with the focus on the impact of the international communities in relation to 
the implementation of the ISPS Code, whilst the second paper (IMO Safety Division authors, 
Hesse and Charalambous) focuses on the IMO findings of global issues that has resulted from 
the application of the ISPS Code. These papers view of the ISPS Code is on a practical level 
and focus is made on the impact of its implementation on the maritime environment and the 
impact on the IMO. These are the critical areas of impact that are needed in order to assess 
whether the ISPS Code has fulfilled its purpose. In essence it will be showed that the ISPS 
Code plays a dual role of providing protection against terrorist activities and enhancing the 
efficiency of the maritime industry.  
4.5.1  IMO identifies Global Issues in Maritime Security  
Global issues in maritime security have been identified in an Implementation Assessment of 
the ISPS Code conducted by the Senior Deputy Director Captain Hartmut G. Hesse from the 
Maritime Safety Division of IMO. The outcome of the Assessment indicated:  
Inadequacies: 
 IMO has been provided with inaccurate or incomplete data. 
 Guidance material provided by IMO is not being utilised completely. 




 The methodology in setting security levels. 
 The port facilities definition. 
 Providing training that is related to security. 
                                                          
213 HG Hesse ‘3 years on –What are the Global Issues in Maritime Security’ (2007) available at 
www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/InformationResourcesOnCurrentTopic/MaritimeSecurity and 
ISPSCode/Documents/Information%20Resources%20on%20MARITIME%20SECURITY%20ISPS%20code.p
df (accessed on 19 June 2015). 
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 The aspects related to security of non-SOLAS ships operations. 
 The basic provisions for receipt of Ship Security Assessment.214
 Training of duly authorized officers. 
 
 Pre-arrival information requirements for ships.215
 
 
4.6  The progress made by the ISPS Code in fulfilling its purpose  
The foremost objective of the ISPS Code is to address security concerns in maritime 
transportation, specifically, terrorism. However, its provisions also addresses other security 
issues such as theft, piracy and smuggling which is an additional benefit of the ISPS Code.   
IMO Safety Division authors, Hesse and Charalambous indicate that the organisation views 
the enhanced security measures in a positive light. These authors note that the new security 
measures provide not only protection from terrorist and other criminal acts but also enhance 
the efficiency of the maritime industry by the: 
 Reduction in delays 
 Quicker handling times 
 Improved asset control 
 Reduced losses owing to theft 
 Decrease in the cost of insurance216
4.7 Recommendations to the IMO  
 
In light of the inadequacies and inconsistencies identified in the ISPS Code, the following 
recommendations were made to IMO by Hesse in order to address the situation: 
 Model national legislations and guidelines should be developed with specific focus on 
the implementation process.  
 Security-related operation of non-SOLAS vessels should be provided guidance. 
 Provide direction on the basic and specific security-related training. 
 Provide guidance on conduct of exercises and drills that is security-related. 
 To conduct regional workshops and seminars on a periodical basis.217








Additional recommendations for the IMO: 
 Strong collaboration and coordination at international and national levels regarding 
systems and processes for improving the ISPS Code. 
 Assistance and direction to vessels that find them themselves in difficulties after 
calling at a high-risk port. 218




 Amendment of the ISPS Code to address its enforceability by specifically amending 
the IMO Member State audit scheme to become mandatory instead of voluntary.
 
220
 The development of a global maritime security network as cooperation between 
nations can address the concerns of this international threat.
 
221
 To increase the effectiveness of the implementation of the ISPS Code, Contracting 
Governments should include in its national legislation of the ISPS Code, emergency 




 Development of a Regulation that would enhance the maritime security of ships that 
fall outside the scope of the ISPS Code. In doing so it would close the loophole in the 
provisions and protect itself against possible exploitation by criminal networks. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
Maritime security threats in a number of Contracting States have been effectively addressed 
by the implementation of the ISPS Code. The maritime environment can strengthen the 
effectiveness and enforceability of the ISPS Code through the implementation of 
recommendations made by various authorities and learned persons in the maritime field.  
Identifying inadequacies, inconsistencies and also realising the true potential of the ISPS 
Code is essential for the success of this relatively new piece of legislation. Finding solutions 
to challenges experienced in the implementation of the ISPS Code is part of the process 
                                                          
218L H Bergqvist op cit n 113. 
219Ibid. 
220 J Jibkwon op cit n 16 at 74. 
221LCDR Jon D. Peppetti, JAGC, USN ‘Building a Global Maritime Security Network” (2008) 55 Naval Law 
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refining the ISPS Code as well as enhancing its effect and efficiency and as such the opinions 
of various participants in the maritime industry should be considered.  
The IMO playing such a prominent role in maritime security in consistently reviewing its 
legislation in order to improve its value to the maritime community and such introducing 
methods and programmes to ensure that gaps identified is closed. For instance IMO has 
acknowledged that its inability to enforce its Regulations as that is the responsibility of the 
Contracting Governments, the IMO can only monitor compliance.223 However the IMO 
addresses this situation by introducing “train-the-trainer” programme which is aimed at 
providing assistance of the implementation process of the ISPS Code. Those that are 
responsible for training and implementation of the ISPS Code will be trained by Instructors of 
the IMO who are qualified and approved.224
Furthermore, gaps/challenges/weaknesses/shortcomings experienced and identified regarding 
the application of the ISPS Code should be relayed to the IMO as well as Contracting 
Governments in order to improve maritime security. 
  
South Africa has acted on its responsibility as one of the SOLAS Member states by 
implementing the ISPS Code via its domestic legislation, namely The Merchant Shipping 
(Maritime Security) Regulation 2004, which is a comprehensive and concise guide on how to 
enhance its maritime security measures. In addition, South Africa’s commitment of ensuring 
that its maritime environment is secure is demonstrated in the adoption of Regulation 2004 
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Marine Notice No. 12 of 2008 
The Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004 
 
TO MASTERS AND OPERATORS OF INTERNATIONALLY TRADING SHIPS BOUND FOR 
SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS, THEIR AGENTS, SOUTH AFRICAN ASSOCIATION OF SHIP 
OPERATORS AND AGENTS, HARBOUR MASTERS, CAPE TOWN RADIO, THE MARITIME 
RESCUE CO-ORDINATION CENTRE (MRCC) AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 
 




This marine notice gives guidance to the industry on the application of the Merchant 
Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004, and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
 
1 South Africa has implemented the Maritime Security requirements contained in Chapter XI-2 of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code through the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004. 
These regulations apply to South Africa’s seven major ports, namely Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, 
Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, and Richards Bay. They also apply to passenger 
ships, cargo ships of 500 or more gross tonnage and mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) on 
international voyages. However, they do not apply to fishing vessels, vessels used solely for sport or 
recreation, government ships engaged solely on non-commercial voyages, coasting ships, and ships 
transiting South Africa’s territorial waters. 
 
Certification of South African ships  
 
2 The South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) is responsible for approving ship 
security plans for South African ships, for verifying compliance with plans, and for issuing the 
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) and Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR).  
 
Security Level in South African territorial waters  
 
3 Security Level 1 applies in South Africa's territorial waters. Any change of security level or its 
area of application will be notified by Marine Notice, Navigational Warning and Notices to Mariners.  
 
Port security  
 
4 Security Level 1 is the default security level applying to South Africa’s seven major ports (and 
the port facilities in these ports). Any change of security level will be declared by the Director-
General: Transport, who is required to give proper notice of the declaration.  
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5 In accordance with Regulation XI-2/9 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1974, and paragraph B/4.39 of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code the 
Director-General: Transport has under the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004, 
determined the requirements for pre-arrival and pre-entry information. The full official text of the 
determination is published by Government Notice No. R. 1412 in Government Gazette No. 27048 of 
10 December 2004. 
 
6 Pre-arrival information is required from foreign passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 or more 
gross tonnage and mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) on international voyages bound for South 
African ports. 
 
7 These requirements do not apply to fishing vessels, vessels used solely for sport or recreation, 
government ships engaged solely on non-commercial voyages, coasting ships, and ships transiting 
South Africa's territorial waters, including ships calling off-limits at a South African port for the 
transfer of stores, crew, landing an ill crew member, etc. However, for ships calling off-limits 
voluntary compliance is encouraged and may avoid delay in the event, for example, of transfer 
operations having to be done within port limits because of adverse weather conditions. 
 
8 Reports are not required from ships making voyages between South African ports (i.e. 
coasting). If a ship makes a voyage to a port in another country (e.g. Maputo - Mozambique or Walvis 
Bay - Namibia), a pre-arrival/pre-entry information report must be made before any subsequent call at 
a South African port. Also, when a ship is coasting between South African ports and interfaces with 
another ship between ports, the master must transmit a pre-arrival/pre-entry information report as 
soon as possible, but at least 5 hours before the ship's ETA. 
 
9 The format and content of the pre-arrival/pre-entry information report is given in Annex 
A. Masters are advised to exercise care when drafting reports, particularly when using a single / or 
double //. The report comprises groups of words and numbers identified by a prefix, with a double // 
used to separate the groups and a single / used to separate words or numbers within a group. It should 
be noted that in the format of the report field “B” is the time of making the report and field “J” is the 
ETA at the first port of call. There should be at least a 96 hours difference in the times. 
 
10  The report must be made at least 96 hours before the ship’s expected time of arrival 
(ETA) at the first South African port. If the ship is arriving from a foreign port where the voyage 
time between ports is less than 96 hours, the master must ensure that the pre-arrival/pre-entry 
information is sent in compliance with the 96 hour requirement and updated when the ship clears the 
last foreign port. 
 
11  An amended report must be made if: 
 .1  the ETA date for the ship changes; however, a change in time on the same day need not 
be reported; or 
 .2  there has been a ship-to-ship or ship/port interface after the original report was made; or 
 .3  any other information in the original report changes, excluding those noted in 11.1. 
 
12 The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Cape Town is the second point of 
contact for pre-arrival/pre-entry information. The pre-arrival/pre-entry information report must 
be in English and in writing, and is to be transmitted to the MRCC via Cape Town Radio, (the 
first point of contact). The MRCC will only accept reports directly from the ship via Cape Town 
Radio; no reports by voice communication will be accepted. The role of the MRCC is to scrutinise 
reports for correctness and completeness. 
 
13  The MRCC does not security-clear ships. Its function is to check pre-arrival/pre-entry 
information reports to ensure relevance and completeness. If MRCC has any queries regarding the 
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ship's report, it will communicate with the ship via Cape Town Radio. The MRCC forwards checked 
reports to the Maritime Security Co-ordination Centre (MSCC), which is responsible for informing 
port security officers (PSO) about ships' security clearance status. Ships' agents should, therefore, 
obtain security clearance information from the relevant PSO directly. 
  
14 The preferred means of ship-to-shore communication for pre-arrival/pre-entry information 
reports is via telex. The telex system assures receipt of the message at Cape Town Radio. The report 
can be transmitted on telex number 095 511600 or alternatively on 095 521846. (The prefix 095 
is the international dialing code). If Inmarsat C is used, the ship's officer can confirm receipt by 
selecting the option "request delivery confirmation" on the ship’s terminal. A ship's agent can also 
confirm receipt 6 hours after transmission by contacting Cape Town Radio on the help line  
0800 222 208. 
 
15 Transmission by means other than telex has resulted in communication difficulties which, in 
turn, have caused delays to ships. Only in exceptional cases such as faulty or unavailable satellite 
communication, will Cape Town Radio accept a forwarded e-mail message from a ship's agent 
(provided the agent confirms receipt of the e-mail with Cape Town Radio). Cape Town Radio will 
not forward an e-mail message to the MRCC without this confirmation. When e-mail is used, reports 
must not be sent as e-mail attachments, but must be in the e-mail body text because the Cape Town 
Radio IT system strips attachments from e-mails. Cape Town Radio's e-mail address is 
maritimeradio@ixmail.co.za 
 
16 Pre-arrival/pre-entry information required by this notice for maritime security purposes is 
similar to port entry information required by the National Ports Authority (NPA) for berth planning 
purposes. However, the format and use of this information differs considerably. Masters and agents 
are advised to ensure that information for the MRCC is not confused with that required by the NPA. 
 
17 Masters are cautioned that failure to timeously transmit complete and correctly 
formatted pre-arrival/pre-entry information may result in delays and, in appropriate cases, 
denial of port entry. Ships whose masters refuse to give pre-arrival/pre-entry information will 
be denied port entry. 
 
18 The following table provides information about port security officers (PSOs) at the seven major 
ports. The contact number in bold print in the table is the 24-hour contact number for the PSO.  
 
Port  Name  Telephone  Facsimile  Mobile  
Saldanha Bay  Mr S Gaika  (022) 703 5478 (022) 703 5484  083 285 3505  
Cape Town  Mr T Gagavu  (021) 449 4270  (021) 449 2274  083 376 8826  
Mossel Bay  Ms D Joyce (044) 604 6273  0866 487 739  072 708 4378 
Port Elizabeth  Mr M Mwelase  (041) 507 1773 (041) 507 1963/56  083 652 4705  
East London  Ms N Sinxoto (043) 700 2060/2313  (043) 700 2070  083 417 3920  
Durban  Mr H Strydom  (031) 361 3771  (031) 361 8393  083 387 1491 
Richard’s Bay  Mr W Ndlanzi  (035) 905 3146 (035) 905 3126  083 286 2094  
The international dialling code prefix for South Africa is +27. The local area code prefix is shown in brackets in the 
table above. When dialling from outside South Africa, dispense with the 0 in the local code prefix.  
 
Information regarding port facility security officers (PFSOs) can be obtained from the PSO, the port 
facility operator or the local ship’s agent. 
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19 The MRCC is also the contact point for ships seeking information on maritime security 
(excluding confirmation of receipt of the ISPS report) within South Africa’s territorial waters. A ship 
under threat in the territorial waters can communicate with the MRCC, who will forward the alert to 
the appropriate authorities. The MRCC’s Duty Officer can be contacted via Cape Town Radio or as 
follows:  
 Telephone : +27 (021) 938 3300 
 Facsimile : +27 (021) 938 3309 
 E-mail : mrcc.ct@samsa.org.za 
 
20 A ship under threat at a South African port can communicate with the local Port Control, the 
PSO, PFSO or the MRCC.  
 
21 A ship security alert signal from a foreign flagged ship will go to the ship owner or flag State 




22 In the interests of safety all ships are encouraged to participate in the South African Ship 
Reporting System (SAFREP). This system assists in search and rescue by providing up-to-date 
information on shipping in the event of a maritime casualty. It is modelled on IMO Resolution 
A.851(20) regarding general principles for ship reporting requirements. It makes use of movement 
reports submitted to Cape Town Radio by ships within the South African search and rescue region. 
Participation in the system is voluntary. Information regarding SAFREP may be found in the 
Admiralty List of Radio Signals.  
 
Anchoring outside port limits  
 
23 Masters, owners and operators are reminded that it is an offence in terms of the Marine Traffic 
Act, 1981, to anchor or stop a ship (for repairs or otherwise) in South Africa’s territorial or internal 
waters outside port limits without permission from SAMSA. Permission to anchor or stop may be 
obtained by submitting to the MRCC a pre-arrival information report together with a request to 
anchor or stop. The MRCC will forward the request to the local Principal Officer for decision.  
 
24 A ship that has to anchor or stop in an emergency must inform SAMSA as soon as possible, but 
at least within one hour after anchoring or stopping. Masters are reminded that SAMSA has the 
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This Notice is a general advisory notice to the industry regarding stowaways on board ships 
specifically departing ports along the West African Coast . 
 
This Notice is to advise Masters of ships departing ports along the coast of West Africa to pay 
special attention, immediately after sailing from the last port, to carry out a thorough inspection of 
the ship spaces that may be accessed without clearing the ship gangway security.  Particular 
attention is to be directed to the RUDDER TRUNK SPACE. 
 
 
South African Maritime Safety Authority 
 
 




Date: 22 August 2014 
 
Marine Notice No. 20 of 2014 
MERCHANT SHIPPING (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004; “Unlawful 
Interference with Maritime Transport” – STOWAWAYS. SOLAS – CHAPTER 
XI – 2 Maritime Security. 
 
















Vessels departing from ports of the West Coast of the African Continent b o u n d  f o r  S o u t h  A f r i c a  
f i n d ,  upon arrival at the first port of call stowaways in the rudder trunk space of the ship. 
 
It is alleged that these people embark the ship when alongside, especially in ports having river access, with 
the aid of dugout canoe or small rowed boats. 
 
SOLAS Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security. 
Regulation 1.  Definitions. 
 Security incident  means any suspicious act or circumstance threatening the security of the ship, 
including a mobile offshore drilling unit and high-speed craft, or of a port facility or of any 
ship/port interface or any ship/ship activity. 
 
Regulation 2.  Application. 
1. This chapter applies to: 
 .1 the following types of ship engaged on international voyages: 
  .1.1 passenger ships, including high- speed passenger craft; 
  .1.2 cargo ships, including high- speed passenger craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards; and 
  .1.3   mobile offshore drilling units; and 
 .2 port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. 
 
Reading from the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code),  
Part B, Item 8 (Ship Security Assessment). 
8.9 The SSA (Ship Security Assessment) should consider all possible threats, which may include the 
following types of security incident: 
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Reading   also; 
9.9 The SSP (Ship Security Plan) should establish the security measures covering all means of access to 
the ship identified in the SSA.  This should include any (but is not restricted to): 
.1   access ladders; 
.2   access gangways; 
.3   access ramps; 
.4   access doors, side scuttles, windows and ports; 
.5   mooring lines and anchor chains; and 
.6   cranes and hoisting gear.  Adding; 
.7   access to void spaces in particular the rudder trunking space. 
 
Quoting from Part A, Requirement 19. (Verification and Certification for Ships.) 
19.1 Verifications. 
.1   Each ship to which this Part of the Code applies shall be subject to the verifications 
specified below: 
.1 an initial verification before the ship is put into service or before the certificate required 
under section 19.2 is issued for the first time, which shall include a complete verification of 
its security system and any associated security equipment covered by the relevant provisions 
of chapter XI-2, of this Part of the Code and of the approved ship security plan.  This 
verification shall ensure that the security system and any associated security equipment of 
the ship fully complies with the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2 and this Part of the 
Code, is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which the ship is intended.         
19.2 Issue and Endorsement of Certificate. 
.1  An International Ship Security Certificate shall be issued after the initial or renewal 
verification in accordance with the provisions of section 19.1. 
 
Application of this Marine Notice. 
The Master of any ship departing the last port of call along the West Coast of the African Continent, 
specifically bound for South Africa or in fact, for any other next port of call, is to apply whatever facilities are 
available at that port, enabling the ship’s Security Officer to conduct a thorough search of the rudder trunk 
space having external access to this space via the rudder. 
 
Furthermore, at the earliest opportunity, the owner of the any ship operating along this coastline, is to make 
arrangements for suitable gratings to be welded over this access position, thereby preventing any external 
human access into the rudder trunk space. 
NOTE:  This external human access prevention grating shall not, in any way possible, hinder the full 
operation of the ship’s steering mechanism.  The ship’s Classification Society’s approval of this 
modification will also be recommended. 
 
In addition and at this present time, failure to eliminate the transportation of STOWAWAYS from this coast 
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South African Maritime Safety Authority 
 
Ref:  SM6/5/2/1 
   SM12/5/5/3 
 
 
Date:  30 March 2015 
 
Marine Notice No. 5 of 2015 
Procedures to be followed for Bulk Cargo Shipment which are not listed in the 
IMSBC Code. 
 
TO SHIP OPERATORS, MASTERS, SHIPS’ AGENTS AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS 
 
Summary 




It is apparent that a degree of confusion currently exists within the shipping industry as to the statutory 
procedures which have to be complied with for the shipment of solid bulk cargoes which are not listed in the 
IMSBC Code. 
 
All parties involved in the shipment of solid bulk cargoes shall ensure that they have available and readily at 
hand the latest current edition of the IMSBC Code (International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code) which 
is published by I.M.O. This publication which is updated at regular intervals lays down in great detail 
information as to the manner in which solid bulk cargoes should be shipped and should always be consulted 
prior to planning actioning any shipment. The procedures / actions to be complied with for listed cargoes are 
laid down within the code. 
 
The procedures to be followed for unlisted cargoes are dealt herewith.  All concerned should strictly adhere 
to these procedures which are statutory. Non-compliance and improper planning of shipments will prejudice 
marine safety and undoubtedly lead to costly delays. 
 
Shipments of unlisted cargoes require SAMSA approval. Provisions of the IMSBC apply to all vessels to 
which the SOLAS convention as amended applies and are carrying solid bulk cargoes. Application 
accompanied by the required documentation should be timeously submitted to the Principal Officer SAMSA 
at the intended port of loading. 
 
The following summarises the procedures for unlisted cargoes. The code should be consulted for detailed 
advice. (See section 1, item 1.3 through to item 1.3.3, pages 9 and 10 of the 2013 edition of the code) 
 
 When a solid bulk cargo that is not listed in appendix 1 of the code is proposed for carriage in bulk, 
the shipper shall prior to loading provide SAMSA at the port of loading with the characteristics and 
properties of the cargo in accordance with Section 4 of the code. Based on the information received, 
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 Section 4 of the code relates to assessment of acceptability of consignments for safe shipment.  
(IMSBC Code 2013 Edition, Page 25). Section 4 deals with:- 
1. Identification and classification. (4.1) 
2. Provision of information.  (4.2) 
3. Form for cargo information. (4.2.3) 
4. Certificates of test.  (4.3) 
5. Sampling procedures.  (4.4) 
6. Interval between sampling / testing and loading for TML (Transportable Moisture Limit) and 
moisture content determination. (4.5) 
7. Sampling procedures for concentrate stockpiles.  (4.6) 
8. Examples of standardised sampling procedures, for information.  (4.7) 
9. Documentation required on board the ship carrying dangerous goods. (4.8) 
 
 When it is assessed that the solid bulk cargo proposed for shipment may possess hazards as those 
defined in Group A or B of the code and as defined in 1.7 (Definitions) advice is to be sought from 
the competent authorities of the port(s) of unloading and the flag state of the carrier.. The three 
competent authorities will set the preliminary suitable conditions for the carriage of the cargo. 
 
 Reference should be made to MSC.1/Circ. 1454 of 9 July 2013. 
 
 When it is assessed that the solid bulk cargo proposed for carriage presents no specific hazards for 
transportation, the carriage of the cargo shall be authorised. The competent authority (SAMSA) shall 
advise the competent authorities of the port(s) of unloading and the flag state of the carrier of such 
authorisation. 
 
 The competent authority at the port of loading (SAMSA) shall provide to the Master of the vessel a 
certificate stating the characteristics of the cargo and the required conditions for carriage and handling 
of the shipment. The Competent Authority shall also submit an application to the organisation within 
one year from the issue of this certificate to incorporate the solid bulk cargo into Appendix 1 of the 
code. 
It is again stressed that all parties concerned with both listed and unlisted solid bulk cargoes should have readily 
at hand an up to date copy of the IMSBC Code and that all applications and documentation should be submitted 
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